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Abstract  The aim of this research project is to explain why changes to the European institutions were pursued with the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The institution of concern is 
that	  which	  encapsulates	  the	  European	  Union’s	  foreign	  policy and external relations. This aim is pursued through a deductive application of two of the New Institutionalisms: Historical 
Institutionalism and Discursive Institutionalism. Historical Institutionalism, with its emphasis on path dependence and decisive historical events, establishes a link between the decision of expanding the European Union in 2004 and the institutional changes inherent in the previously mentioned Treaty in regards to the area of foreign policy. This link is consequently unfolded and explained by the application of Discursive Institutionalism. The focus of the analysis is on the discourses present within the European Council. Thus Discursive Institutionalism explains how the ideas inherent in discourse, conveyed through agency, has acted as the causal mechanism linking the decision of enlargement with the need to pursue institutional change. Consequently we conclude that the discourses show how enlargement of the Union has instigated the push for institutional changes to the European Union foreign policy institution. 
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Chapter  1  Introduction   
 
This chapter introduces our field of interest by presenting relevant facts and debates. Following, we 
have formulated a thesis, which is rooted in the existing academic debates on our case. The thesis is 
part of our point of departure, when forming our research in the following chapter, Chapter 2 
Approach.   
 
1.1 European Union Foreign Policy  
Since its establishment the European Union (EU) has changed and evolved in many aspects. The 
roots of the EU can be traced all the way back to the period post the Second World War, where 
collaboration was highlighted in prevention of repeating such a catastrophe (European Union 
2014a). Since then, collaboration has evolved and the European Union has expanded in competence 
and in number of member states. The preamble of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 perfectly illustrates 
this development stating the treaty as foundation of  ‘an ever closer union’  (Phinnemore 2013:28).  
Foreign policy has, like many other policy areas, been attention of coordination and 
integration by the member states (Dover 2013:241). With the Maastricht Treaty entering into force 
in 1993 the EU established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) replacing the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC) established in 1970 (Dover 2013:243). The CFSP has 
continually evolved and gradually changed, reaching its preliminary conclusion with the ratification 
of the Lisbon Treaty (Dover 2013: 242-244).     
The Lisbon Treaty in 2009 brought significant structural and institutional changes to the 
CFSP (Church & Phinnemore 2013:52; Lewis 2013:155; Dover 2013:248; European Union 2014b). 
An example of this is the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy (HR). The HR was the successor to the mandate given to Javier Solana as High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The new HR was given an 
empowered mandate and in attempt to improve  consistency  in  the  EU’s  external  actions  the  HR  will  
act both as vice-president of the European Commission and preside over the newly created Foreign 
Affairs Council (Dover 2013:250). Further, the HR is supported by a newly established European 
External Action Service (EEAS), which constitutes   the   European   Union’s   diplomatic   corps   and  
operates in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the member states (Dover 2013:249; EU 
2009:Art 27 TEU; European External Action Service 2013), Consequently, Robert Dover defines 
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the EEAS as a ‘brusselsization’   of   the   CFSP (Dover 2013:248). Finally, the Lisbon Treaty 
introduced new provisions to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The treaty 
amendment indicates a step towards a military dimension of the European Union, as the member 
states shall make military assets available for operations identified by the European Defence 
Agency (Dover 2013:250). These three aspects, which even only points to the overall changes as 
they were introduced with several much more structural, technical and legal changes, indicates the 
wish of the European Union to establish itself as an important player on the international stage. For 
this reason and many more the CFSP as amended with the Lisbon has been debated and scrutinized 
by many scholars and politicians. Thus the following paragraph presents a small selection of 
attitudes toward the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. 
  
Debates on the European Union Foreign Policy   
Much debate on the Common Foreign and Security Policy has been concentrated on how the 
changes should be understood. Especially the bridging of the Council of the European Union and 
the European Commission has been discussed in terms of whether it creates a more supranational or 
intergovernmental set-up of the EU. Ingolf Pernice claims that with the merge EU is aiming at 
being   ”(…)   perceived as one unit, speak with one mouth and implement consistent policies in 
external matters.“ (Pernice 2009:50). Thus the merge will enhance the EU in its external matters, 
which is also underlined by Wolgang Schüssel. He claims that EU has become more capable of 
addressing global problems with one voice because “The new Lisbon Treaty provides us with a 
useful   tool   for   strengthening  Europe’s  global   role.”   (Schüssel  2010:7).  However   the   changes   are  
not only addressed as enrichments. Kamil Zwolski characterises the Lisbon Treaty as both an 
opportunity and a challenge, when stating that “These and other reforms provide an opportunity for 
a more consistent international community security policy of the EU but they also create a new set 
of challenges.”   (Zwolski  2012:79). Zwolski e.g. points to a possible tension and overlap between 
roles of the President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign and Security Policy. Anne-Claire Marangoni also focus specifically on the new posts 
claiming that the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy has  ‘one hat too 
many’,   by  which success is unlikely due to the tremendous task the position entails (Marangoni 
2012:16).        
Other scholars have focused on the reasons behind conducting the Lisbon reforms – contrary 
to the actual impact of the reforms. Niklas Helwig claims that prior to the Lisbon Treaty the EU 
Page 6 of 69  
suffered a capability-expectation gap, meaning that the ambitions in regard to EU as a unified 
global actor exceeded the extent to with EU could take actions (Helwig 2013:237-238). The Lisbon 
Treaty sought to fix this by increasing the capabilities of the EU in the area of foreign affairs, by 
providing additional institutional resources. However, with this empowerment the expectations to 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy grew as well. Thus, at present 
the EU faces a new gap between capabilities and expectations (Helwig 2013:236). The 
expectations, which Helwig refers to, are arguable connected to different incidences, which the EU 
wished to address. In this regard Christian Kaunet and Sarah Léonard explain institutional changes 
in light of exogenous shocks. They claim that the changes to the European security policy 
institution was result of terror attacks on 11 September 2001, which “(…)  provided such a major 
exogenous shock required for a change in the EU polity, which EU institutions exploited by 
providing increasing EU legislation (…)”   (Kaunet  &  Léonard  2012:417). This claim, that events 
external to the EU plays a role in shaping the EU, is underpinned by Robert Dover, who refers to 
both the war in Afghanistan and Iraq along with the civil war in Former Republic of Yugoslavia, 
when explaining the creation of Treaty of Lisbon (Dover 2013:245,247).  
Others argue that the most significant reason to reforming the EU is the enlargement of 
member states. Dover states that when reflecting on enlargement in the post-Cold War period the 
EU was split between whether to extend its competence of the CFSP area first or whether to enlarge 
first (Dover 2013:242). This resulted in a compromise where competences were extended whilst 
preparing for enlargement. This perfectly reflects the EU’s long history of making reforms and 
treaty amendments to enable coping with challenges that the union faces (Phinnemore 2013:39).  
As evident from the debate above there are different claims as to what have affected the EU 
and thereby what have triggered the changes in the CFSP. The CFSP has undergone many small 
changes since its establishment in 1993. The development has been accompanied by both 
opportunities and difficulties due to the nature of EU both an intergovernmental and supranational 
institution (Smith 2013:222).  
 
Understanding and explaining change  
In  continuation  of  the  paragraphs  above  it  is  evident  that  the  European  Union’s  foreign  policy  has  
changed through time and thus we expect it to change again in the future. Therefore we find it 
highly relevant and interesting to study the change   and   dynamics   within   the   European   Union’s  
foreign policy. Consequently, the aim of our project is to understand and explain the changes to the 
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European Union foreign and security policy. Based on our research on the European Union foreign 
policy, on enlargement and on treaty amendments we have developed a thesis. The thesis reflects 
our assumptions prior to the analysis and therefore we expect to be able to reflect upon the thesis 
with renewed appreciation after the conduction of the analysis. The ambition is thus not to be able 
to definitely verify nor reject it through the analysis.  However a crucial aspect has become apparent 
to  us  through  our  research  on  the  European  Union’s  foreign  policy;;  the  content  of  the  Lisbon  Treaty  
is considered alike with the content of the Constitutional Treaty, which was signed by the European 
Council in 2004 but rejected by French and Dutch voters in 2005 (Church & Phinnemore 
2013:43;48). Our   interest   in   the   European   Union’s   foreign   policy   departs   from   the   significant  
changes in 2009, though as result of this similarity of the treaties, we do not intent to study the 
Lisbon amendments. On the contrary we set out to explain the changes as proposed with the 
Constitutional Treaty. This reasoning is further elaborated in section 2.1 Definition of Case of 
Interest. Consequently our thesis is as follows:   
 
The enlargement in 2004 was a significant element in the push for changes, as proposed by the 
Constitutional Treaty, in the area of the European Union’s  foreign policy.  
 
The thesis underlines enlargement, in contrast to e.g. external shocks like terrorism, which were 
also highlighted in the debate above. By only referring to enlargement in our thesis we do not reject 
the importance of such external shocks. On the contrary we expect them to have influence as well.  
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Chapter  2  Approach   
 
In this chapter we introduce the approach of our project and justify our choices in regards to both 
theoretical and methodological aspects. The chapter first establishes the overarching approach and 
aims of our study; secondly, defines our case; thirdly, discusses our theory and finally, defines our 
method and analysis design.     
 
2.1 Aims and Approach of Project and Problem Statement  
Most of our choices in regard to the project are closely interlinked. We therefore find it necessary to 
first introduce the most important and overarching aspects of the project. Thus this section gives a 
short introduction to our study and clarifies our problem statement.  
 
Aims and Approach of Project  
As stated in the previous chapter, the aim of our research is to explain the change to the European 
Union foreign policy institution. We wish to study what mechanisms lead to these changes and 
thereby be able to understand and explain – therefore we focus on how and why (Diez & Wiener 
2009:17). Our thesis indicates that we assume that there is causality between the big Eastern 
enlargement in 2004 and the changes in the European Union foreign policy institution. Thus we aim 
to both examine whether this causality can be accounted for and how it can help explain the 
changes. 
 To examine our thesis we have chosen a deductive approach; we aim to explain the changes 
in the foreign policy institution through a theoretical framework. Consequently, theory is placed at 
the centre of our research project. We apply Historical Institutionalism (HI) combined with 
Discursive Institutionalism (DI). Historical Institutionalism is applied to examining causality and 
we apply Discursive Intuitionalism to explain causality. We draw mainly on literature by Paul 
Pierson, Kathleen Thelen and Theda Skocpol in regard to HI and by Vivien Schmidt in regard to 
DI, as these are the central scholars within the respective approaches.  
We claim that the enlargement was not a single event but a process. We argue that already 
when the countries applied for membership it impacted the discourse in the European Council. 
Therefore we underline 1994, as this was a significant year in relation to membership application 
for the 10 joining member states in 2004. Consequently we study the change by establishing what 
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have caused it and by tracing changes in discourse within the European Council, in the time period 
from 1994 to 2004, for the purpose of establishing the causal mechanisms causing change. This 
period is defined on basis of our focus on the enlargement and the signing of the Constitutional 
Treaty.  
In order to trace change and discourse we rely on the method of process-tracing, which provides us 
with a research frame. We intend to conduct the process-tracing within a thorough document 
analysis. Thus we include a significant amount of empirical data in our project as we take point of 
departure in all official European Council Presidency Conclusion in the period 1994-2004. 
 
Problem statement 
As mentioned above we have how and why at the centre of our research. Our priority is the causality 
between enlargement and changes in the area of European Union foreign policy. However as we 
solely insinuate this causality based on our research prior to our analysis, we frame our problem 
statement  in  an  ‘open’  manner – as  opposed  to  a  ‘yes  or  no’-question. Our problem statement is as 
follows:    
 
Why  were  changes  proposed  to  the  European  Union’s  foreign  policy  with  the  Constitutional  
Treaty?     
 
Though  we  ask  ‘openly’  we still have our thesis in mind, which will be our point of departure when 
conducting   our   analysis.   The   ‘open’   question   allows   us   to   include   other   reasons as well if we 
identify such through the analysis. The problem statement indicates a focus on explaining, as we 
ask why, however as we do not only aim to identify a reason to the changes but also understand the 
mechanism behind the reasons we identify, we formulated yet another question. We will refer to 
this question as our research question, as answering it enables us to fully underpin our answer to the 
problem statement. Our research question is as follows:  
 
How  can  the  changes  to  the  European  Union’s  foreign  policy,  proposed  by  the  Constitutional  
Treaty, be explained?  
 
In order to understand how we approach the questions it is crucial to underline our deductive 
approach. We apply Discursive Institutionalism in order to conduct   a   ‘deeper’   analysis   to   the  
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answers, which Historical Institutionalism can give us. Thereby we will mainly draw on argument 
from Historical Institutionalism when analysing the problem statement and mainly draw on 
arguments from Discursive Institutionalism when analysing the research question. As mentioned in 
above, our understanding of the central concepts and thus also the understanding of the problem 
statement will be clarified through the following sections.  
 
2.2 Definition of Case of Interest  
Before   conducting   a   study   it   is   important   to   “be clear on what it is that is to be explained”  
(Gustavsson 1999:75). Therefore this section clarifies how we understand and define our case. 
Some of our arguments and definitions are influenced by our theoretical approach and though we 
have not yet unfolded the theories we find it necessary to clarify our case before moving on. 
Therefore this section is connected to section 2.3 Choice of Theory: An Institutional Study and 
Chapter 3 Operationalisation of Theory.    
 
Foreign policy  
As foreign policy is at the centre of our project it is essential to clarify what we mean by foreign 
policy. In international relations Robert Jackson and George Sørensen define foreign policy as:  
 
“(…) the management of external relations and activities of nations-states, as distinguished from 
their domestic policies.” 
(Jackson & Sørensen 2013:252)      
 
In that connection foreign policy is essentially studied in contrast to national policies. Further the 
definition is based on the premise that the study is a study of a nation state – by which it is 
complicated to transfer it directly to the EU context. Thus we argue that the essential part of their 
definition in our context is management of external relations. This aspect is also emphasised by 
David Allen as he defines foreign policy as:  
 
“(…)  an attempt to design, manage and control the external activities of a state so as to protect and 
advance agreed and reconciled objectives.“ 
(Allen 2005:44)   
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Besides emphasising management, and in close link hereto also design and control, Allen too 
defines foreign policy in relation to a state. However, as our study is not a study of the European 
polity as such we do not wish to discuss whether the European Union can be compared to a state or 
not. Instead we make the assumption that we can apply this definition to our study, as we are 
mainly interested in defining what international relations are, not who conducts them.  
Consequently,  we  turn  to  rely  on  definitions  referring  to  the  reality  of  the  EU’s  foreign  policy,  
contrary to academic theoretical definitions of foreign policy. Anne-Claire Marangoni states that: 
 
“The  EU’s   external action is characterised by its dichotomy. On one side, there is the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); on the other side there are economic external policies – such 
as trade and development policies. They are still separate, although a strict distinction between 
them is not sustainable as they substantially interact with one another.” 
(Marangoni 2012:4) 
This can then be linked to the two first definitions where foreign policy is defined in terms of 
external relations or activities. Marangoni then  describes  specifically  the  EU’s  external  aspect.  She  
divides   the  EU’s   external   actions   in   two:   the  Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
economic relations – both covering extensive areas. We direct our study towards the CFSP as the 
European Union primarily conducts its foreign policy and external relations within this frame 
(European Union 2014c). On the official webpage of the European Union, www.europa.eu1, the 
CFSP is described as:     
 
“(…)  based on diplomacy – backed where necessary by trade, aid and security and defence – to 
resolve conflicts and bring about international understanding.” 
(European Union 2014c) 
 
And  further  the  role  of  the  EU’s  foreign  and  security  policy  is  defined  as: 
 
                                                        1 www.europa.eu is run by the communication department of the European Commission on behalf of the European 
Union institutions   
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“(…)   to preserve peace and strengthen international security; to promote international 
cooperation; and to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms.” 
(European Union 2014c) 
 
This indicates that the CFSP is a broad and comprehensive establishment. Thus we do not intend to 
present a distinguished definition of foreign policy within the European Union. Besides the fact that 
it would be difficult to define it in a single sentence, we also claim that it would be paradoxical in 
relation to our specific study. We aim to explain change in the European Union foreign policy 
institution by examining it through time and thus if we define our object prior to our analysis then 
how can we trace change? Thus we consider foreign policy as a dynamic subject. However we do 
find it necessary to establish a basic understanding of foreign policy in the European Union and to 
this we rely on the definition by Theofanis Exadaktylos. He discuses the CFSP in relation to 
national foreign policy and states:   
 
“In that respect, foreign policy is defined in a broader framework of coordination of economic, 
political and military tools.” 
(Exadaktylos 2012:195) 
 
We will depart in this definition. But as mentioned above we will focus on the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy due to its central position. Consequently our focus will be on the political 
aspects of the foreign policy, though we do not intend to exclude findings related to the other areas 
if they are of significance to our case.  
Additionally, when we refer to the European Union foreign policy from hereon we will refer 
to it as an institution: the European Union foreign policy institution (EU-FPI). This is evident from 
the following paragraph.  
 
Our institutional understanding 
Our understanding of institutions is broad and will encapsulate elements of both the Discursive and 
the Historical Institutional schools, which will be elaborated in Chapter 3 Operationalization of 
Theory. We understand institutions, in relation to agents, as simultaneous structures and constructs, 
which enables them to change through the influence of agency. Thus, to us institutions structure the 
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behaviour of agents by limiting and offering possibilities and visions for action. This is in line with 
both Historical and Discursive Institutionalism. However, we also accept the possibility of agency 
in relation to institutions. This entails that we conform to the understanding that agents are capable 
of influencing and changing the institutions, which relate to them, by envisaging them differently 
than what they are. Additionally, our practical understanding of what institutions are and contain is 
broad. We apply the concept to describe an area of policy. Thus when we mention the European 
Union foreign policy institution (EU-FPI) it refers to all the policies that relate to foreign policy and 
external relation, but it also encapsulates the ideas that relate to these areas. 
 
Constitutional Treaty  
The Lisbon Treaty was initially our point of departure, but as mentioned in Chapter 1 Introduction, 
much literature suggests that the content of the treaty was the content of the Constitutional Treaty. 
Hence we define the Constitutional Treaty as our case of change, underpinned by this paragraph. 
We will elaborate on change in a paragraph below. 
 
The Constitutional Treaty was signed by the member states on 29 October 2004, but both a French 
and   a   Dutch   ‘no’-referendum in May 2005 put a definite end the implementation of the treaty 
(Chruch & Phinnemore 2013:44-46). The treaty was designed to replace all of the existing treaties 
and create a single constitutional document (Church & Phinnemore 2013:44).   
 
In the textbook chapter by Clive Church and David Phinnemore the Lisbon Treaty is considered a 
reframing of the rejected Constitutional Treaty (CT), as most parts of the Lisbon Treat was 
originally part of the Constitutional Treaty, only adding few new aspects (Church & Phinnemore 
2013:48). The EU itself also proclaims this, as the Lisbon Treaty is introduces as follows: 
 
“The majority of the institutional and policy reforms envisaged in the Constitution are included in 
the Treaty of Lisbon, but presented in a different form.” 
(European Union 2014d) 
  
Thereby it is clear that intentions with the Lisbon Treaty to a large extend was the same as the 
intentions with the Constitutional Treaty, which was rejected by French and Dutch voters in 2005, 
and thus put in the ground. This is also the conclusion of a comprehensive report by the 
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independent think tank Open Europe, who compares the two treaties article-by-article (Open 
Europe 2008a:3). They underpin their findings by referring to quotations by the heads of states of 
the member states claiming that the two treaties are largely the same (Open Europe 2008b:3-5). 
Further, Jens-Peter Bonde, Danish member of the two constitutional conventions, presents the same 
argument,  and  he  draws  on  quotations  by  e.g.  Valéry  Giscard  d’Estaing,   former  Chairman  on   the  
Convention on the Constitution, who claims that:  
 
“In fact, the content is the same. Legally, it is a matter of treaties, and they can be ratified as such 
by the national parliaments. But the substance is still the Constitutional Treaty.” 
 (d’Estaing  (2007)  in  Bonde  2007:9) 
 
Thus we argue, when studying why and how the contemporary European Union foreign policy 
institution came about it is necessary to study the process leading up to the Constitutional Treaty. If 
the changes were in fact already decided upon with the Constitutional Treaty, the period from the 
2004 to 2009 would not provide us with much insight into the reasons for the change. Therefore to 
understand the changes of the Lisbon Treaty we argue that one must study the period leading up to 
the Constitutional Treaty. However it is extremely essentially on this regard for us to underline that 
we are aware that the Lisbon Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty were not identical and that the 
context changed as three years passed by from the signing of the Constitutional Treaty to the 
signing of the Lisbon Treaty. Therefore, we do not intend to conclude anything in regard to the 
Lisbon Treaty based on our analysis, but we claim that our study can help identify some of the 
reasons behind the changes to in contemporary European Union foreign policy institution. 
 
Enlargement and timespan of case 
As we emphasise enlargement in connection to analysing the changes in the European Union 
foreign policy institution we have defined the time frame of our case due to the enlargement. We 
study the first phase of the Eastern enlargement where Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Czech Republic and Slovenia were given full given full member state 
status on 1 May 2004 (Juncos & Borragán 2012:231). The second phase included Bulgaria and 
Rumania joining in 2007 (Juncos & Borragán 2012:228). We have chosen to focus on this specific 
enlargement as it is leading up to the signing of the Constitutional Treaty on 29 October 2004. As 
the European Union foreign policy institution, and thus the treaty is our object of analysis, it will be 
the signing of the treaty that marks the end of the timespan of our case opposed to the date of 
Page 15 of 69  
accession. Consequently all events after 29 October 2004 is not considered within the scope of our 
project.   
Additionally, we argue that the enlargement was not a single event; the enlargement in 2004 
was the culmination of long negotiation process (Juncos & Borragán 2012:231). Though the ten 
countries share date of accession they individually applied for membership in the period 1990-1996 
(Juncos & Borragán 2012:231). In 1993 the European Council created a list of conditions, the 
Copenhagen Criteria, which countries had to comply with in order to join (Juncos & Borragán 
2012:230). We have then defined the beginning of the timeframe of our case in regard to the first 
application post the Copenhagen Criteria, as only Cyprus and Malta, applied prior to the 
Copenhagen   Criteria.   Consequently   the   beginning   of   our   timeframe   is   marked   by   Hungary’s  
application on 31 March 1994.  
Finally, as we study a proposed amendment to the Treaties, it is relevant to point out that our 
timespan (31 March 1994 – 29 October 2004) covers two treaty amendments: the Amsterdam 
Treaty, signed 2 October 1997 with entry into force 1 May 1999 and the Nice Treaty signed 26 
February 2001 with entry into force 1 February 2003. During our analysis we will constantly have 
the context of our data, the European Council Presidency Conclusions, in mind, but as we trace the 
continuously development of ideas we do not pay explicitly attention to these two treaty 
amendments.  
 
Change and causality   
As evident from the problem area, the changes that the EU has undergone within the foreign policy 
institution, is at the centre of attention throughout the forthcoming analysis. Though as we define 
the changes as highly complex, we wish to scrutinize these as departure in our analysis.  
 
The European Council 
As we do not intend to examine the entire European Union we have chosen to focus on the 
European Council (EC). As we trace the discourse surrounding the European Union’s foreign 
policy institution to understand how it changed, it is important to trace the discourse among those 
who are capable of changing the institution and conducting the specific policies, which is the 
European Council. The EC creates the guidelines for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
adopts the common strategies (Dover 2013:249). The EC is the gathering of the heads of state or 
government of the member states (European Union 2014e). It began as an informal forum in 1974, 
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was then granted formal status in 1992 and in 2009 it became an official institution (European 
Union 2014e). In the period until 2009 the European Council was planned and chaired by a rotating 
presidency rotating equally every sixth month between the member states (Lewis 2013:151). We 
will reflect on this aspect in link to our data selection in Chapter 4 Data Presentation and 
Discussion. We will not go into detail about the structures or procedures of the European Council, 
as it in itself if not our object of analysis. We are interested in how the European Council perceives 
itself as a unity in external matters, and thus we will also perceive the EC as a unity and not analyse 
upon given states in presidency or internal disagreements. Furthermore the EC interacts with other 
institutions within the EU, which establishes interaction. This aspect is included in the analysis but 
the EC is the centre of attention. 
Additionally, our choice of studying the European Council is linked to, not only our focus on 
European Union’s foreign policy, but also on enlargement. The accession of new member states has 
directly impact on the European Council as it expands in numbers and thereby it is likely that it will 
become more difficult to reach unanimity.     
 
2.3 Choice of Theory: An Institutional Study   
This section establishes our theoretical approach. Historical Institutionalism and Discursive 
Institutionalism is both justified within the frame of New Institutionalism and in relation of other 
distinguish approaches.    
 
New Institutionalism  
As section 2.1 Aims and Approach of Project and Problem Statement clarified we aim to investigate 
the changes in the European Union foreign policy institution, as proposed by the Constitutional 
Treaty, by studying the process leading up to the changes. As it is then change in itself we wish to 
explain we have chosen to investigate our case through the theoretical outlook that Discursive 
Institutionalism (DI) possess. DI is the resent branch belonging to the school of New 
Institutionalism (NI). NI is a broad approach, which traditionally is referred to as Rational-Choice 
Institutionalism (RI), Sociological Institutionalism (SI) and Historical Institutionalism (HI) 
(Skocpol & Pierson 2002:706; Pollack 2009:125). As mentioned above we also to a large extend 
apply Historical Institutionalism as we study change through the temporal sequence within the 
timespan of our case. We apply DI and HI to supplement each other.  
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DI   differs   from   the   other   NI’s   by   claiming   that   institutions   are   not   solely   influences   by  
external rules but rather that institutions are simultaneously structures and constructs internal to 
agents (Schmidt 2008:303). In other words institutions do not exist autonomous of the agents, but 
rather institutions can be influenced by agents because they exist in a reciprocal relationship. The 
influence can either result in change or continuity of the institution. Because of this view on agents 
and institutions DI is a dynamic theory and therefore is more likely to be able to explain change, 
which is the main reason why we apply DI. Furthermore DI emphasises the explanatory power of 
ideas, which is accentuated through the causal mechanisms that is driven by discourses, as 
underlined by Vivien Schmidt. The turn towards ideas and discourses is what enables us to explain 
the changes within the European Union foreign policy institution, because it enables us to 
investigate what happens behind the structural setting. The process of conveying ideas and 
discourses is what enable change to be upheld (Schmidt 2011a:107). We therefore argue that by 
employing the concepts developed by Schmidt in DI we are able to answer our problem statement. 
However, as also emphasised by Schmidt, DI is unable to stand alone as it relies on the other 
NI’s  to  provide  background  information  (Schmidt  2008:314).  It  is  in  this regard that we utilize HI to 
answer our problem statement, as it can helps us identify why, and we will then apply DI to fully 
understand the answer by studying how. Though Schmidt refers to HI as background information, 
HI will be at the beginning of our study and in this way construct the frame, by which DI will be 
applied within. This is done as we view the logic of critical junctures within HI as having great 
significance on the agency. In continuation hereof, Paul Pierson emphasis, that the political 
development must be understood as a process over time and that institutions affect the political 
development (Pierson 2000a:264-265). Thus by combing HI with DI we are able to study the 
process which led to the change in the EU-FPI with the Constitutional Treaty. Furthermore it will 
prevent our discursively focused analysis from becoming too disconnected by situating it in a 
historical context, framing what is important. Furthermore HI enables us to investigate the interplay 
between institutions (Skocpol & Pierson 2002:706). This aspect is in perfect continuance with the 
concept of the process of interaction within DI. 
By combining HI and DI we are able to investigate both the external and the internal aspects 
of the timespan of our case – HI defines the frame while DI explains the content. We are able to 
detect what the institutions are affected by (critical junction) and how the causal mechanism 
(discourse) commenced by the agency, which results in change within the institution. In 
continuation hereof we are able to detect if any new critical junctures affect the agency, because it 
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will create a change in the agency (discourse). We can thereby study the entire timespan of the case 
in depth both external and internal.   
 
New Institutionalism In Contrast To Other Theories 
As the paragraph above have accounted for the combination of DI and HI, this paragraph will 
concentrate on our choice of new institutionalism in contrast to other theories. NI is a meso-level 
theory and thus we will discuss it in contrast to other meso-level theories and grand theories 
(Skocpol & Pierson 2002:709).  
Our case of foreign policy is usually studied within the field of international relations and 
therefore it would have been natural to select theories like neorealism or neoliberalism. These grand 
theories often examine foreign policy as the external behaviour of states (Telbami 2002:158). In this 
way foreign policy is e.g. studied an instrument to pursuit national interests in the international 
sphere, and thus foreign policy is studied in contrast to national policies (Jackson & Sørensen 
2013:252). We study foreign policy in relation to the specific integration process within EU, by 
which we pursue theories more directly linked to EU-studies; hence we do not apply grand theories 
of international relations.      
Within the studies of the European Union neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism are 
considered grand theories. These are, furthermore, theories of integration, which emphasise the 
process of integration, contrary to the concern of the political system, which integration creates 
(Diez & Wiener 2009:2-3). Though we emphasise the process of integration in our study, 
integration itself is not our point of departure. The EU-FPI is our object of interest; we study the 
process of integration in order to explain the EU-FPI outcome in the Constitutional Treaty. The EU-
FPI is our case and integration is a central aspect of the case – we have not chosen EU-FPI as case 
because we want to study integration. We focus on the institution, and therefore we do not apply the 
grand theories, but instead we rely on the new generation of integration theories, who emphasises 
institutions: new institutionalism (Diez & Wiener 2009:9). We are investigating a specific 
institution at meso-level as we focus on the organisational changes (Skocpol & Pierson 2002:707).  
Often debates of integration are linked to debates of governance, as they exist in a circular 
relationship  (Peters  &  Pierre  2009:102).  Governance  theories  are  concerned  with  the  EU’s  capacity 
to govern effectively (Peters & Pierre 2009:91). Thus governance is related to integration as it 
establishes the possibilities for further integration or for preserving the achieved level of integration 
(Peters & Pierre 2009:103). It is possible to argue that our object of interest, the European Union 
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foreign policy institution, is an example of EU enhancing its capacities to govern effectively on this 
specific policy area – especially after the reforms with the Lisbon Treaty. Then our case is a perfect 
case for governance approaches, but as these would primarily focus on whether the EU has the 
capacity to fulfil its goals, we do not apply governance approaches as we aim to trace the process 
leading up to the Constitutional Treaty to examine why and how the EU-FPI was changed (Peters & 
Pierre 2009:91). Enlargement is considered to have profound consequences for the governance of 
the EU (Peters & Pierre 2009:102). Therefore, it is likely that when analysing our data we will find 
arguments by the European Council claiming that the EU-PFI must be reformed in order for the EU 
to govern external relations more properly, but this does not make our study a study of governance 
as it is still the process of change we focus at.    
Consequently, we do not apply governance theory as we do not study the adequateness of 
European governance, e.g. if it is effective or legitimate. We do not study if the changes in the 
CEU-FPI are desirable for neither the European people nor it leaders. We study the process leading 
to the changes in the EU-FPI, and thus our project links more to integration theories, than to 
governance approaches, because of their process orientation. However the process itself is not our 
object of interest – we do not study integration for the sake of explaining how integration conducts. 
Our case is an expression of integration in EU, but our focus is on the change in the EU-FPI, thus 
we apply Discursive Institutionalism and Historical Institutionalism.     
 
2.4 Methodology: Tracing and Mapping  
This section clarifies our methodological approach. Our utilization of process-tracing is defined, the 
different steps of the analysis are presented and how we find data to our document analysis is 
explained.  
 
As we apply theory deductively theoretical aspects have influence on our methodological approach. 
The method of process-tracing is applied when studying the causal mechanisms in a causal 
relationship (Beach & Pedersen 2013:1). We aim to both establish a causal relationship and explain 
what makes it a causal relationship. First, we apply Historical Institutionalism to establish our 
independent variables and their relationship to the selected dependent variable, which is our case. 
Thus it is a question of why the EU-FPI changed. Second, we apply Discursive Intuitionalism in 
order to explain the causal relationship between the variables – how the independent variables have 
caused an outcome by influencing the dependent variable. The focus on causality, which Process-
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tracing emphasises, has emphasised the relevance of not just establishing the relationship between 
the variables, but also establishing how the variables influence each other. Therefore, as applied 
through process-tracing Discursive institutionalism, which aims to explain change by identifying 
mechanisms within discourse, becomes a relevant tool to spread out our analysis (Schmidt 
2008:308). However, in order to get to this stage, it is necessary for us to establish the independent 
variables, which caused the changes to the European Union foreign policy institution. Thus we will 
commence a Historical Institutional analysis on the basis of an operationalisation of Historical 
Institutionalism, Chapter 3 Operationalisation of Theory, and refer to historical events pointed out 
by our data. 
 
Process-tracing 
In several of her articles Vivien Schmidt refers to methods of tracing e.g. when demonstrating why 
some ideas succeed or fail; when demonstrating when key decisions are made; when demonstrating 
the causal influence of ideas; or when demonstrating the change in ideas over time (Schmidt & 
Radaelli 2004:191,206; Schmidt 2006:16,25; Schmidt 2008:308-309,311; Schmidt 2011a:112). 
However, she does not pay much attention to the methodological aspects of conducting such 
research. Thus we rely on methods presented by Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. They 
highlight process-tracing, where the ambition is to trace causal mechanisms when studying causal 
relationships (Beach & Pedersen 2013:1). Schmidt argues that discourse has a causal influence on 
institutional change, and as we aim to explain the changes to the European Union foreign policy 
institution, we find process-tracing a appropriate frame for our research design and thereby enabling 
us to answer our problem statement. Further, Beach and Pedersen claim that process-tracing enables 
the researcher to go one step further when studying causal relationship, by placing causal 
mechanisms at the centre of the study (Beach & Pedersen 2013:1). This is in line with the work of 
Vivien Schmidt as she aims to explain change (or continuity) by examining specific mechanisms, 
defined by her as ideas and interaction. We will return to the definition of causal mechanisms 
further down.   
 
Beach and Pedersen identify three variants of process-tracing: theory-testing process-tracing, 
theory-building process-tracing and explaining-outcome process-tracing (Beach & Pedersen 
2013:21). The two first approaches are theory-centric and trace generalizable mechanisms, contrary 
to the latter approach, which is case-centric and trace case-specific mechanisms that explain the 
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specific case (Beach & Rasmussen 2013:21). Our project is case specific but we have a deductive 
approach, and by this combination the three distinctions of process-tracing become less significant 
as Beach and Pedersen claim that when being deductively case-centric one must apply steps from 
the theory-testing process-tracing (Beach & Pedersen 2013:19). Consequently, our approach is 
founded by both the deductive path within the explaining-outcome process-tracing and by the 
theory-testing process-tracing.  
Additionally Beach and Pedersen argue that to chose an explaining-outcome approach the 
choice of case must be justified by the case being a particularly puzzling and interesting outcome 
(Beach and Pedersen 2013:164). As accounted for in Chapter 1 Introduction and section 2.1 
Definition of Case of Interest we argue that the outcome of the Lisbon Treaty, relating to the 
institutional changes to the European Union foreign policy institution, is particularly interesting due 
to the institutional   changes   and   also   of   great   significance   as   the  EU’s   ability   to   conduct   foreign  
policy was enhanced.  
 
Causal Mechanisms  
Methods of process-tracing have a mechanismic ontology of causality (Beach & Pedersen 2013:25). 
By a mechanismic understanding of causality focus is directed at how causes have dynamic 
influence on outcomes and how a sequence of interlocking parts of causal mechanism transmits as 
causal forces producing an outcome (Beach & Pedersen 2013:25). Thus the causal forces from an 
independent variable, X, to a dependent variable, Y, are of interest, which will result in deeper 
explanatory power, than when solely stating the causal relationship between X and Y (Beach & 
Pedersen 2013:25). E.g. one must study the forces that make an apple fall to the ground – and not 
just presenting the causality that when dropped (X) then the apple falls (Y). Beach and Pedersen 
portray  this  as:  “X Æ mechanism Æ Y”  (Beach  &  Pedersen  2013:26).   
The understanding of causal mechanisms differs (Beach & Pedersen 2013:23). Generally 
mechanisms are considered to be especially complex within case-centric process-tracing as they 
often consists of overlapping parts, due to the ambition of being as close to reality as possible. 
Contrary, within theory-centric approaches mechanisms are predefined and can be split into 
separate parts for research (Beach & Pedersen 2013:19). More specifically, within deductive 
approaches   mechanisms   are   considered   to   “(…) help build the best possible explanation of a 
particular outcome.”  (Beach & Pedersen 2013:19). Thus we intend to explain our case by drawing 
on arguments presented within the discursive and Historical Institutionalisms. It is therefore 
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important to underline that our conclusion in terms of a theoretical combination must not be 
separated from our particular case, as it will then be without value (Beach & Pedersen 2013:19).  
In our case we wish to understand the changes to the EU-FPI by identifying and underpinning 
discursive mechanisms in the causal relationships, which we establish trough analysis of our data in 
section 5.1   Explaining   Reasons   to   Changes   to   the   European  Union’s   Foreign   Policy   Institution. 
Vivien Schmidt emphasises the causal effect that discourse may have on institutions by instigating 
change, however, process-tracing helps us to emphasise the importance of utilizing causal 
mechanisms to explain an outcome of a specific case. Further, as result of our deductive path we 
limit our workload as Schmidt has already conducted a significant amount of research, which 
suggests the correlation between discourse and institutional change. Thus, we do not need to 
establish this logic through empirical work ourselves, but we need to formulate a context specific 
conceptualisation of discourse, which can account for its probable effect, as a causal mechanism 
instigating institutional change (Beach & Pedersen 2013:57-58). 
 
Analysis and Conceptualising Causal Forces 
Beach and Pedersen state that theory should be split into parts of causal mechanisms, focusing on 
how specific actors and specific activities can produce change (Beach & Pedersen 2013:50). This 
leads to an ideal conceptualisation, by which the theory can be tested beyond the context in which it 
was developed (Beach & Pedersen 2013:51). As it is not the aim of our project to test the accuracy 
of DI and HI, we do not intend to present the theories in such manners. Instead we rely on the 
approach within case-centric process-tracing. On this regard Beach and Pedersen state that tracing 
starts by outlining the case. Thus our project is placed somewhere within the two approaches. 
Consequently, we will present the essential concepts of both DI and HI prior to the analysis, though 
we do not intend to present them in a specific systematic or strictly operationalized manner by 
which they would appear to be objects of analysis themselves. We apply DI and HI as tools to help 
us explain our case. Thus the concepts are central, but not used in a dogmatic way. DI and HI are 
presented in the following chapter Chapter 3 Operationalisation of Theory.  
Finally, due to our deductive approach we have chosen to underpin our claim about the 
enlargement in 2004 being a critical juncture through an analysis.  
Following these arguments our analysis will be split in two steps, conducted around our two 
theories of HI and DI and our two questions raised in Chapter 1 Introduction. This is illustrated in 
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figure 1 below. Step 1 focuses on the causal relationship and step 2 focuses on the causal 
mechanisms. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Mapping of documents  
This paragraph is mainly concerned with our method in regard to data selection, whereas Chapter 4 
Data Presentation and Discussion presents our specific data and reflects upon the consequences of 
the data. In order to trace discourse we will conduct a document analysis, in contrast to e.g. survey 
techniques or interviews. Document analysis is considered a primary research technique to uncover 
change in discourse and study causality over time (Lynggaard 2012:91). As also mentioned above, 
we departure our analysis in the European Council Presidency Conclusions.  
In order to select the documents in which we intend to trace change we apply the method of 
mapping. By mapping we refer to the method of backwards-mapping, also called snowball-method, 
prescribed by Kenneth Lynggaard as a point of departure for selecting relevant documents for 
analysis (Lynggaard 2007:225).  
To commence mapping, one needs to identify a point of departure in the shape of either a 
central actor or a central document (Lynggaard 2007:225; Lynggaard 2012:91). As our central actor 
is  the  European  Council,  we  use  the  report  “The European Council – 50 years of summit meetings”  
(2012), which is an official European Council publication, which lists all its meetings 
chronologically from 1961 to 2010. Thus this report identifies the meetings that we need to find 
Analysis Step 1 
 
Historical Institutional analysis of 
independent variables triggering 
changes in the EU-FPI, with point of 
departure in enlargement as critical 
juncture 
 
Purpose: Explaining reasons to 
changes to the EU-FPI 
 
Outcome: establishment of causal 
relationships in our case 
Analysis Step 2 
 
Discursive Institutional analysis of 
mechanisms within the established 
causal relationships from step 1. 
 
Purpose: Understanding changes to 
the EU-FPI 
 
Outcome: explanation of causal 
relationships 
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official documents from. As a next step we have used the webpage of the European Council where 
central documents are published2. By supplementing the report with the substantive data from the 
webpage we construct our point of departure in the mapping method. Thus we consider the report 
and the webpage our primary documents (Lynggaard 2012:91). 
The mapping method consists of tracing all references from one document to other 
documents. This trace is followed until no new documents surface (Lynggaard 2007:226). By using 
this method we ensure that we do not neglect important data by definitely define our data before 
initiating the analysis. At the same time it is likely that we will be presented to a large variety of 
documents, by which not all will be relevant to our research. Thus we argue that it is necessary to 
have a critical and realistic approach when selecting data, and constantly keeping our problem 
statement in mind as guideline to judge if a document is relevant or irrelevant. The result of our 
mapping is presented in Chapter 4 Data Presentation and Discussion, which defines the ground for 
our analysis.   
 
   
                                                        
2 http://www.european-council.europa.eu/council-meetings  
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Chapter  3  Operationalization  of  Theory 
 
The scope of this chapter is to operationalize our theory, Historical Institutionalism (HI) and 
Discursive Institutionalism (DI), in order to apply it analytically for the purpose of explaining 
institutional change. We operationalize the theories separately as they will mainly be applied this 
way in the analysis. The operationalisation is structured according to the concepts of the theories. 
Thus we will unfold these and explain how they interlink. Though both HI and DI are approaches 
within the overarching theory of New Institutionalism (NI), we will not elaborate on the general 
aspects of NI in this chapter, as it was of attention in section 2.3 Choice of Theory: An Institutional 
Study.     
 
3.1 Operationalization of Historical Institutionalism 
Historical Institutionalism presupposes that history, and the process associated with history, 
influences institutions in important ways (Skocpol & Pierson 2002:693-695). According to Theda 
Skocpol and Paul Pierson history may have causal relevance for explanations of contemporary 
conditions (Skocpol & Pierson 2002:701). Historical Institutionalism has been accused of merely 
being capable of explaining institutional creation and stability, while lacking the theoretical 
concepts necessary to explain changes to existing institutional setups (Schmidt 2008:313-314). 
However, this section will show that Historical Institutionalism can go a long way in accounting for 
institutional change. Historical Institutionalist accounts of institutional change involve a lot of the 
same concepts that explain institutional creation and stability. Thus it will be necessary to explain 
both sides of these concepts to fully grasp their explanatory powers. Additionally, the concepts of 
Historical Institutionalism are characterised by a great deal of interconnectedness, why the section 
will start with a joined elaboration of Historical Institutionalism, capturing its entirety, whereupon 
short elaborations of the different concepts will follow.  
 
Institutional understanding 
First of all, the institutional understanding of HI is that institutions structure incentives, options and 
constraints for the actors related to them. They allocate resources, create power imbalances and are 
the products of conflicts among unequal actors (Skocpol & Pierson 2002:706; Thelen 1999:388). 
Institutions interact and influence each other and are influenced and operate in broad contexts. 
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There are multiple institutional realms and processes, which intersect with one another, creating 
unintended openings for actors who trigger changes and institutions can be stable or unstable 
(Skocpol & Pierson 2002:706). Skocpol and Pierson furthermore state that institutions are not 
functionalistic, meaning that institutional outcomes are not explained by their consequences 
(Skocpol & Pierson 2002:708;). This does not mean that actors cannot have instrumental intentions, 
rather   it   is   an   indication   that   even   instrumentally   acting   actors’   actions   may   have   unanticipated  
effects   (Pierson   2000b:483)  As   a   supplement   to   this   Pierson   elaborates   that   due   to   actors’   short-
sightedness, institutions should not be understood through their long-term effects, as these are likely 
to be defined by unintended consequences of the institutional design, thus not telling much about 
their original purpose (Pierson 2000b:479,483). There are exceptions however. In certain 
institutional environment the actors of importance are not entirely concerned with the short-term 
effects and benefits of institutional creations, but may instead plan ahead. In such environments 
institutional origins may be analysed by looking at the long-term consequences (Pierson 
2000b:479). Furthermore, where institutions were designed with long-term effects in mind, then the 
functionalistic design is likely to be true (Pierson 2000b:483). There is, however an inherent long-
term functionalistic scope of institutional creation in that actors often design institutions to be 
binding. Institutions may serve as lock-in  mechanisms,   tying   the  hands   of   actors’   successors   and  
thereby making long-term agreements possible (Pierson 2000b:480). With this also follows that 
institutions are difficult to change and partly resistant to change, because of the idea of binding 
successors to decrease uncertainty (Pierson 2000a:262). This is evident, for example with the high 
institutional barriers to change, which are part of some institutional setups, such as unanimity votes. 
Institutions are, according to HI, notoriously difficult to close down due to the concept of 
path dependence, as elaborated below. Thus, if necessary they are mostly changed, not scrapped, in 
order to adapt to changing conditions. This gives them a layered quality, meaning that new 
initiatives, which are introduced to address contemporary demands, merely add to institutional 
forms instead of replacing them (Skocpol & Pierson 2002:709). Such layering has the consequence 
that older institutional choices may shine through the current functioning of the institution (Skocpol 
& Pierson 2002:709). 
 
Path dependence 
Path dependence can, with some certainty, be termed the most fundamental concept of HI. It is the 
understanding that preceding steps in one direction induce further steps in the same direction or that 
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what happened at an earlier stage has consequences for what can happen at a later, thus 
encapsulating the all important assumption of HI: history matters (Pierson 2000a:252). Kathleen 
Thelen says of path dependence that it can explain institutional development along certain 
trajectories, constrained by past trajectories (Thelen 1999:387). Because of its centrality this 
concept is strongly connected to the other concepts of HI. Skocpol and Pierson call path 
dependence the dynamic of self-reinforcing or positive feedback processes in a political system 
(Skocpol & Pierson 2002:699). This is grounded in the understanding that outcomes at critical 
junctures trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into the 
future (Skocpol & Pierson 2002:699). Path dependence together with the feedback mechanisms, as 
accounted for below, makes it difficult to reverse course once particular path is chosen and 
followed, as the costs of reversal are understood to rise with the feedback mechanisms reinforcing 
the path dependence (Skocpol & Pierson 2002:700; Pierson 2000b:491). Additionally, path 
dependence may serve as a lock-in mechanism, limiting the available options on account of actions 
taken in the past and can be reinforced by for example institutional barriers to change, such as 
unanimity votes (Pierson 2000b:492; Pierson 2000a:262). To us path dependence is central because 
it can explain both institutional development and thus also the changes to institutions, for the reason 
that institutional development is subject to feedback mechanisms (Pierson 2000a:252).  
 
Positive feedback, increasing returns and costs of reversal 
The logic behind what we term feedback mechanisms, but which is also termed positive feedback or 
increasing returns, is that further steps down the same path increase the cost of reversal. Because 
the relative benefits of the activity compared to other options increase over time – the cost of 
choosing alternatives rises (Pierson 2000a:252). The feedback mechanism also entails that when a 
historical event creates a path, this is reproduced even though the decisive event no longer occurs. 
This is attributed to the feedback mechanism (Pierson 2000a:263). Due to this, it can be understood 
as the underlying source of path dependency (Pierson 2000a:251). This is so, because it is what 
actually causes actors to not reverse their course, but stick to the direction in which they are moving 
the institution. Examples of such mechanisms are the established patterns and institutional rules of 
the game, which will often generate self-reinforcing dynamics (Skocpol & Pierson 2002:700). 
Furthermore, feedbacks also transform the consequences of later developments (Skocpol & Pierson 
2002:701). Due to its underlying centrality and thus its consequences for institutional development, 
the feedback mechanisms are key to understanding why some critical junctures are in fact critical 
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and why timing counts, and thus it becomes the key to making sense of the mix of stability and 
change which characterises the institutional world (Pierson 2000a:265; Thelen 1999:400). This will 
be further elaborated below. 
 
Critical junctures 
Critical junctures are firstly historical events. Kathleen Thelen defines critical junctures as events 
having the capacity to undermine institutional paths, while Paul Pierson attributes to critical 
junctures that they punctuate political development (Thelen 1999:392, Pierson 2000a:251). With 
this follows that because of the implications of path dependence, and its ability to ensure 
institutional stability and equilibrium, critical junctures are necessary to punctuate institutional 
development, pointing it in a new direction (Pierson 2000a:251) Additionally they are decisive to 
the development of paths and Pierson claims that they are the crucial object of study because with 
the critical juncture the necessary conditions for the current outcome occurred in the past (Thelen 
1999:387; Pierson 2000a:263). According to Skocpol and Pierson social processes may be slow 
moving and incremental, thereby taking time to add up to something of importance (Skocpol & 
Pierson 2002:703). This supports the notion that critical junctures may not necessarily come in the 
shape of a clearly visible and abrupt event. Rather, critical junctures may be the result of a longer 
process, which in the end adds up to a critical juncture. This could be a case of a causal process that 
includes several links and is only observable over a longer time span (Skocpol & Pierson 
2002:704). However, feedback mechanisms are the key to understanding why some critical 
junctures are in fact critical and why the timing of these counts, and thus it becomes the key to 
making sense of the mix of stability and change which characterises the institutional world (Pierson 
2000a:265). Elaborating on the importance of critical junctures, Skocpol and Pierson says that 
events and processes following critical junctures are especially important, as they set the course 
which path-dependence will likely follow (Skocpol & Pierson 2002:700). 
 
Relative timing and sequences 
Relative timing and sequencing is decisive to understanding and explaining institutional change. 
Because   of   feedback   mechanisms’   impact   on the cost of reversal, particular periods generate 
irreversibility, which influence and structure which options are available to the actors (Skocpol & 
Pierson 2002:701). Thus, the timing of events is crucial as it may have impact in a time of low 
positive feedbacks or no impact if the positive feedbacks have raised the cost of reversal to a point 
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of no return. This can be explained by pointing to the fact that change only happens when 
institutions are receptive to exogenous shocks. This they are only when path dependence and 
positive feedback is limited. Thus, timing and sequence are important factors to the effect of the 
exogenous shock (Pierson 2000a:264).  
 
Conjunctures 
Conjunctures refer to the interaction effect between separate casual sequences that become joined as 
they occur concurrently (Skocpol & Pierson 2002:702). Thus this concept is particularly intertwined 
with the concept of timing and sequence, as timing and sequence is distinctly important for whether 
events become conjunctures and can be explained as the effects produced when separately 
unfolding processes conjoin (Skocpol & Pierson 2002:703). Thus, this concept together with the 
idea of timing and sequence can help us to understand and explain why some events become 
important to the process of change, even if they do not constitute decidedly critical junctures.  
 
Summary - how institutional change may occur 
The fact that path dependence rests on an assumption that once a path of institutional development 
is chosen divergence from this path is very unlikely, means that in order for a new path to be chosen 
there  must  be  either  limits  to  the  actors’  dependence  on  the  path  or  a  sufficiently  critical  event  must  
have occurred, which can effectively create a juncture. This is very much related to the concept of 
feedback mechanisms. Insofar as feedback mechanisms reinforce a particular path through positive 
feedback, making the cost of choosing alternatives higher, divergence from a path is difficult to 
envisage. However, when the opposite scenario is true and the feedback mechanisms are weak, 
thereby not reinforcing path dependence to the degree that makes actors reluctant to reverse or 
change course because of the costs associated with this, then movement down a new institutional 
path is possible. Change becomes possible. This however, means that the relative timing and 
sequence of a critical event is important, because the feedback mechanism will be decisive to the 
impact of particular events.  
 
3.2 Operationalization of Discursive Institutionalism 
In this section we unfold the concepts of Discursive Institutionalism, which we find relevant for our 
explanation of institutional change to the European foreign policy institution.  
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Discursive institutionalism in short 
Discursive Institutionalism differs from the other New Institutionalisms by placing discourse and 
agency at the centre of the institutional analysis (Schmidt 2011a, 2008). In this way discourse, 
consisting of ideas, becomes the causal mechanism though which agents can instigate institutional 
change (Schmidt 2008:305-306). Thereby agents become detached from structures, but are instead 
understood as capable of acting autonomously of institutions and external structural factors, 
although institutions and structures may influence the ideas, which are the content of discourses.  
 
Discourses 
To conduct an analysis of the causal relationship between discourse and institutional change it is 
necessary for us to first elaborate on what we understand by discourse. Here we will use Vivien 
Schmidt’s  concept.  In  Schmidt’s  theorisation  of  the  relationship  between  discourse  and  institutional  
change, discourse is the overall concept as it is through this concept that institutional change is 
explained (Schmidt 2008:304). Understanding institutions by employing discourse enables the 
researcher to explain change because discourse is understood to be the causal mechanism that 
instigates institutional change. This quality is first and foremost anchored in the assumption that 
discourse can account for the interactive process of conveying ideas, which is fundamental to 
institutional change (Schmidt 2008:303).  
 
Institutions  
Institutions are not considered as being external-rule-following, but rather simultaneous structures 
and constructs, which enables them to change through the influence of agency (Schmidt 2008:314). 
Furthermore, institutions do not only exist externally of the agents, but are simultaneously internal 
and external to them (Schmidt 2008:314). In this way institutions are both given and contingent, by 
constituting the context of agents and by being the results of agency. 
 
Agents 
Agents exist in a reciprocal relationship with institutions. Agents are not restricted by their 
preferences, they do not have fixed interest and they are not perennially bound by the established 
rules of institutions (Schmidt 2008:313-314). This is what makes them capable of changing 
institutions through agency in the first place.  
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Three levels of Ideas 
Ideas are the content of discourse meaning that discourse contains ideas and are made up of them 
(Schmidt 2008:303). There are three levels of ideas: policies, programs and philosophies (Schmidt 
2008:306). A policy, which is the first level of ideas, consists of the specific policies proposed by 
policy makers (Schmidt 2008:306). A policy can constitute a solution to a problem. The second 
level of ideas consisting of programmes can be identified as those ideas that support the policies 
(Schmidt 2008:306). They may be paradigms that reflect underlying assumptions underpinning the 
policies or they may be organizing principles supporting the scope of the policy (Schmidt 
2008:306). Programmes can also be a frame of reference in which politicians can reconstruct the 
beliefs of the actors. All in all the programmes can be understood as policy cores that diagnose a 
problem and provide a solution for it (Schmidt 2008:306). These two first levels, policies and 
programmes, are less basic than the third level, in that they are foreground ideas, meaning that they 
are articulated. The third and last level of ideas is philosophies. This level is the most basic level of 
ideas and is located in the background in the underlying assumptions, meaning that these ideas are 
not necessarily articulated (Schmidt 2008:306). Philosophies are fundamental worldviews that 
underpin the other two levels by organising the ideas, values, and principles of knowledge and 
society (Schmidt 2008:306). As philosophies are difficult to trace as a consequence of their 
underlying nature we will not identify philosophies in our research, as this would be a project in 
itself.  
  
Two categories of ideas 
These three levels of ideas can take the shape of either cognitive or normative ideas (Schmidt 
2008:306-307).  Cognitive  ideas  explicate  “what is and what to do”  whereas  normative  ideas specify 
“what is good or bad about what is”   and   “what one ought to do”   (Schmidt   2008:306).   These  
categories represent two different ways of legitimizing ideas. Cognitive ideas provide the guidelines 
for political action by framing the necessity of specific policies and programmes through an 
interest-based logic (Schmidt 2008:306-307,313).  
 
Two types of discourses 
Discourses can be categorized as either coordinative or communicative (Schmidt 2008:310). The 
coordinative discourse is expressed by individuals or groups situated at the centre of the policy 
construction, the policy sphere between the policy makers (Schmidt 2008:310). The coordinative 
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discourse can serve as a catalyst for institutional change as actors can act as policy entrepreneurs 
through this kind of discourse (Schmidt 2008:310). The communicative discourse is present in the 
political sphere and consists of individuals or groups involved with the presentation, deliberation 
and legitimization of the political ideas to the public (Schmidt 2008:310). It is through these 
discourses the interactive process takes place (Schmidt 2008:311).  
 
Two types of polities 
There are two types of polities where discourses and ideas are conveyed. The first is simple polity, 
which is where policies are communicated through a single authority (Schmidt 2008:312). Within 
this polity the communicative discourse tend to be more elaborated than the coordinative. The 
second is categorized as a compound polity. Within compound polities the governing activity is split 
between multiple authorities and the coordinative discourse tends to be dominant within this kind of 
polity (Schmidt 2008:313).  
 
The interactive process 
The interactive process is what distinguishes DI from the other New Institutionalisms. It can be 
explained as   the   “processes by and through which ideas are generated and communicated.”  
(Schmidt 2011a:107). This concept is what enables agents to change institutions by deliberating 
ideas through discourse (Schmidt 2008:316). The transformative power of ideas lies within their 
ability to present an alternative to what is and the interactive process, which could be called agency, 
is  understood  as  agents’  abilities  to  convey  ideas.  Thus,   the  interactive  process   is  what  allows  the  
researcher to explain change within institutions – it becomes part of the causal mechanisms. 
 
Discursive abilities  
The  interactive  process  is  constituted  by  agents’  discursive  abilities  and  contributes  to  their  abilites  
to conduct agency. These are their background ideational abilities and foreground discursive 
abilities (Schmidt   2008:314,316).   Without   these,   the   interactive   process   would   be   “empty”.  
Background ideational abilities are what explain the creation and sustainability of institutions 
(Schmidt  2008:314).  Agent’s  background   ideational abilities makes them sensitive to institutional 
rules and facts, while allowing them to act and speak without following rules that are external to 
themselves (Schmidt 2008:315). This is linked to the meaning context, which actors draw upon 
when using their background ideational abilities, as it encompasses the ideational rules or the 
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rationality of the setting (Schmidt 2008:314-315). The concept of foreground discursive abilities is 
what can help us to understand and explain how institutions change and persist (Schmidt 2008:314). 
This  concept  is  to  be  understood  as  agent’s  abilities  to  think  and  speak  outside  of  the  institutional  
settings, of which they act, using the logic of communication (Schmidt 2008:315). This concept can 
be   explained   as   agents’   ability   to   speak   of   institutions   from   a   distance   and   is   grounded   in   DI’s  
understanding  that  institutions  are  not  entirely  deterministic  to  agents’  actions  and  behaviour.  This  
understanding of agents as instigators of change through their discursive abilities, accounts for a 
very agent-centric and less deterministic theoretical approach to discourse. In short, by combining 
background ideational abilities of agents, as their knowledge coming from outside of institutions, 
with their abilities to speak and think of the institutions of which they are part through their 
foreground discursive abilities, DI understands institutional change as a discursive process 
instigated through discourse.  
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Chapter  4  Data  Presentation  and  Discussion 
 
In this chapter our empirical data will be presented and reflected upon. The data is selected on the 
ground of the method of mapping and our point of departure in the primary documents as accounted 
for in section 2.4 Methodology: Tracing and Mapping. Further our choice of data is closely linked 
to our case as defined in 2.2 Definition of Case and Interest. 
 
4.1 Data for the Analysis 
As mentioned throughout the previous chapters the European Council (EC) is our actor of interest 
and thus the overall criteria is to select official European Council documents, which enable us to 
trace discourse through a document analysis. We wish to get insight in the perception and 
argumentation of the EU in regards to the European Union foreign policy institution. We are then 
looking for documents stating the outcome of EC meetings within the timespan of our case. Our 
two primary documents have led us to the European Council Presidency Conclusion documents. 
Within the specific documents the EC refers to other meetings or documents, which we have then 
included as data to the extend we found them relevant for our case. Likewise some of the 
Presidency Conclusions entail annexes which consist of reports and documents conferred to the 
European Council from other institutions. Hence the agenda of such meetings is influenced by 
others than the European Council itself.  
The final result of our mapping of documents is presented in ANNEX I. From the annex it is 
evident that we have analysed 34 of Presidency Conclusions, five of European Council 
Declarations, two statements, one Press Release and one Plan of Action and Conclusion. The annex 
shows the chronological order of the European Council Meetings and their reference throughout the 
research paper. In addition to this we will refer to the documents through the points (pt.), annexes 
and page numbers. However the different documents are structured inconsistently, which our 
references naturally will reflect.  
Further, the data differs as result of our two-step-analysis linked to respectively the Historical 
and the Discursive Institutional analysis.  
 
Data for the Historical Institutional Analysis   
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The aim of step 1 of the analysis is to establish causal relationships between changes to the 
European Union foreign policy institution and independent variables. We then apply Historical 
Institutionalism to identify independent variables understood as critical junctures. In this regard the 
Presidency Conclusions are sufficient to the extend the European Council refers to reasons to make 
changes. But to identify and fully underpin causal relationships we need to pay attention to the 
context of our data. Thus we include data to support the conclusions and to outline the historical 
development within our casa. We primary rely on the book European Union Politics (2013) by 
Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán. This book is chosen because it outlines the 
developments that the EU has gone through and therefore enables us to locate the critical juncture 
through our theoretical outlook. Furthermore we support our analysis of critical junctures with 
information from one of the European Union’s official webpages: www.europe.eu. Here we 
specifically  use  the  site  ‘Summaries of EU Legislation’3, which is a specialised information source 
in line with EUR-Lex 4 , PreLex 5  and European Direct 6 . The site holds circa 3.000 unbiased 
summaries of EU legislation.       
 
Data for the Discursive Institutional Analysis 
Step 2 of the analysis, the analysis of the causal mechanisms within the defined causal relationships 
from step 1, will solely be based on the data from annex 1, where the Presidency Conclusions 
constitute the primary part. We aim to understand the changes to the European Union foreign policy 
institution by tracing the foreign policy discourse within the European Council. Thus it is essential 
that the documents we analyse upon are published by the EC itself. This way we do not make the 
base our analysis on studies of others who might have had different intentions with their study. We 
emphasise to rely on primary sources. 
 
4.2 Discussion of European Council Presidency Conclusion documents 
In this section we reflect on our choice of the European Council Presidency Conclusion as our data. 
As mentioned above the primary reason behind this choice is our ambition of selection documents 
coming from the European Council itself, hence official documents.   
                                                        
3 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/about/index_en.htm 
4 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html 
5 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm 
6 http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm 
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Our choice has a clear advantage for our historical approach, as the documents are available 
throughout the entire timespan of our case. This is essential to trace the discourse and causality 
(Lynggaard 2012:91). Further, the Presidency Conclusions reflect the European Council as a unity, 
as they are conclusions. This enables us to grasp the ideas they arrive upon collectively and which 
we claim are the dominant ideas. Interaction of our project lies then not within the interaction 
between the member states in the European Council but interaction understood over time and 
interaction between the EC and other institutions, e.g. the European Commission. The theoretical 
aspects in the previous chapter Chapter 3 Operationalisation of Theory underpin this. We argue that 
by studying the conclusions of the meetings the interactive process is detectable because of the 
timespan that the data entails, which enables us, through our method, to follow the development of 
the discourses and how the ideas are being conveyed. Each meeting in the European Council is 
based on documents forwarded to the European Council, hence the interaction with other 
institutions. However our choice of document analysis limits us in regard to the informal interaction 
emphasised by Discursive Institutionalism. Thus we argue that it would be possible to trace the 
change more accurate if we had access to informal data. This challenge became evident through our 
document mapping as well.  Our  primary  document  the  European  Council  “The European Council – 
50 years of summit meetings”  (2012)  indicates  the  date  and  location  of  informal  and  extraordinary  
European Council meetings. However we have been unsuccessful in locating documents relating to 
all meetings, as not all the meetings resulted in an official outcome. Especially the informal 
meetings have been difficulty to access. Therefore we have outcomes from some of them but not 
all. Consequently we only have access ideas from these informal meetings, when the European 
Council refers to the meetings in other documents. 
Additionally, we find it relevant to consider our data in light of the enlargement in 2004. The 
enlargement changes the number of member states present at the European Council meetings. The 
enlargement happens on 1 May 2004 and we include data until 29 October 2004. As evident from 
annex 1, this means that the last two Presidency Conclusions are agreed upon by a different 
European Council compared to before the enlargement. We do not make this distinction in the 
analysis, as it is not our object of analysis and as we argue that the timespan from 1 May 2004 to 29 
October 2004 is insignificant compared to the overall timespan. 
Finally, in continuation hereof, we neither take account of the changing presidents or 
governments in the individual member states. We do not take into consideration, when the 
government changes within a member state and thus a new person sits in the European Council. 
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Emphasis on personality and social interaction is not within the scope of our theories nor do we 
have any possibilities to examine this aspect. The same argument is evident in relation to the 
rotating presidency of the European Council every sixth month. The presidency is an important role 
for the member states, but as the timeframe of our case spans 10 years the presidency rotates 20 
times, and we do not intend to reflect upon the specific significance of the specific rotations.          
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Chapter  5  Analysis   
 
We conduct our analysis within this chapter. The analysis is progressed as illustrated by figure 1 in 
section 2.4 Methodology: Tracing and Mapping. As we aim to explain and understand change in a 
temporal sequence the two analyses are primarily structured in a chronological manner. As 
significance of our deductive approach the theoretical aspects accounted for in Chapter 3 
Operationalization of Theory is essential to our arguments throughout the analysis.  
 
5.1  Explaining  Reasons  to  Changes  in  the  European  Union’s  Foreign  Policy  Institution 
The section will identify the critical juncture that has affected the changes in the EU foreign policy 
institution, and possible conjunctures that have resulted in the amendments to the institutions. 
With the drafting of the Treaty Establishing A Constitution for Europe (the Constitutional 
Treaty) the EU was preparing to replace all of its existing treaties with one constitutional document. 
Although adopted by the European Council in 2004 it failed ratification by public referenda, 
suggesting that the people of the Union were not ready for further integration (Church & 
Phinnemore 2013:44-46). 
 
Change  
We argue that the Constitutional Treaty, if ratified and enforced, would have amounted to 
significantly changing the European Union foreign policy institution. This is supported by the 
Constitutional  Committee’s  report  on  the  Constitutional  Treaty,  which  establishes  that  “(…)   there 
will  be  a  significant  enhancement  of  the  Union’s  visibility  and  capacity  as  a  global  actor”  with  the  
treaty’s   entry   into   force   (Committee on Constitutional Affairs 2004:pt.3(d)). This is further 
underpinned  on  the  European  Union’s  webpage,  there  it  is  stated  that:   
 
“In the European Constitution, the provisions on the external action of the European Union (EU) 
have been substantially rewritten, making significant amendments and introducing new provisions 
to enhance the current set-up and strengthen the effectiveness and visibility of the Union's action in 
the international arena.” 
(European Union 2014f) 
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The changes can be exemplified when scrutinizing the Constitutional Treaty. For instance that some 
decisions in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy could be made by qualified majority 
voting (QMV) instead of unanimity voting (EU 2004:Article III-300). Additionally the Committee 
report states that the EU will experience enhancement of its visibility and capacity as a global actor 
with the Constitutional Treaty, which is attributed to the merging of the Foreign Policy High 
Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations, creating the office of Foreign Minister 
for the EU (Committee on Constitutional Affairs 2004:pt.3(d)). This is added to by the creation of 
the External Action Service and the conferral of legal personality on the Union so that it can 
effectively act as a third party to international agreements (EU 2004:Article III-297,para.3; EU 
2004:Article III-393). These claims are supported by the French Foreign Service, which states that 
the  Constitutional  Treaty  would  provide  for  a  more  “(…)  coherent, consistent, visible and efficient 
foreign policy”,  backing  up  this  argument  by  pointing  to  the  fact  that  the  pillar  structure  would  have  
been erased, effectively creating a more interlinked EU and stating that an unlimited amount of 
enhanced cooperation for the CFSP would be made possible (French Foreign Ministry 2014). 
Finally,  the  Treaty  itself  points  to  the  aim  of  ensuring  “an ever-increasing degree of convergence of 
Member  States’  actions”  (EU  2004:Art.  I-40). 
 
Incremental change towards a new path 
We argue that the institutional change that the Constitutional Treaty is an expression of, happened 
incrementally and moved from a less coordinated and very intergovernmental approach towards 
increasing coordination and supranationalism. The claim of an incremental change is supported by 
Robert Dover, who argues that the move to a Common Foreign and Security Policy has been a slow 
process (Dover 2013:241). We underpin this argument by claiming that the first sign of institutional 
changes to the European Union foreign policy institution were visible with the Maastricht Treaty, 
which established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the second pillar in its pillar 
structure (Phinnemore 2013:30; European Union 2014i). However, the intergovernmental nature of 
the pillar system ensured that the member states retained their position as the dominant actors in the 
field of external relations and foreign policy (Dover 2013:242-244). Thus the Maastricht Treaty did 
not create a significantly strengthened Community in terms of collaboration on foreign policy 
matters, but it signified a step towards change by setting up the institutional framework for future 
cooperation. Following the Maastricht Treaty the CFSP was deemed ineffective, but there was still 
not sincere support among the member states to deviate from the intergovernmental path that CFSP 
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was on (Phinnemore 2013:31,33). The 1996 Amsterdam Treaty did however bring about 
institutional structures and innovations in the area of CFSP (Dover 2013:243-245). It introduced 
Constructive Abstention, created the High Representative of Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, and Article 13(2), which established the notion of a 
common strategy on foreign policy (Dover 2013:244-245). These initiatives persistently underlined 
the intergovernmental nature of the European Union foreign policy through their strong connection 
to the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Following the Amsterdam Treaty the defence 
and military cooperation of the EU was up for changes, seeing the inception of the European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) including the Petersberg Tasks and a Capabilities Catalogue 
on military resources (Dover 2013:246-248). The Nice Treaty, apart from including the European 
Security and Defence Policy, brought some institutional innovation to the table; Art. 24 allowed the 
Council to use QMV in relation to internal matters, e.g. in decisions on joint action and the 
Commission was tasked with ensuring coordination and coherence between the Member States in 
the area of foreign policy. Additionally, the Member States should duly follow the objectives laid 
down by the EU Council. Furthermore, the former Political Committee was replaced by the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) (Dover 2013:248). Arguably the Nice Treaty was a move 
towards a more supranational approach to foreign policy in the EU. However, the new role of the 
Commission was little more than symbolic, as the agenda was still set by the member states. A final 
argument supporting the idea of a slow and incremental process of change is to be seen in the first 
article  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union.  Here  it  is  stated  that  the  Treaty  “(…)  marks  a  new stage in 
the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples  of  Europe  (…)”,  which  suggests  that  
it is just part of a process towards a more integrated Union (EU 2009:Art. 1 TEU). This claim is 
supported by David Phinnemore (Phinnemore 2013:30). 
Consequently we argue that the institutional changes, which would have culminated with the 
ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, were incremental and not abrupt, following a process 
where change is evident over a time span of 12 years and moving in the direction of a more 
coordinated, coherent and supranational foreign policy.  
 
A critical juncture and a new path 
As already touched upon, we very much anchor our arguments in the Historical Institutionalism 
tradition’s   understanding   of   change.  Thus  we  will   look   to   account   for   a   change   in   previous   path  
dependence, which is likely to explain the changes to the European Union foreign policy institution. 
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As pointed out, we argue that the changes to this institution were first evident with the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, however, we also argue that this beginning change was not abrupt, but rather the 
beginning of a period of incremental change. The break with the previous path dependence would 
have been caused by the appearance of a critical juncture, important and significant enough to 
account for a fundamental change to the existing institutional setup. As already stated, the fact that 
the Constitutional Treaty was meant to signify a leap forward in terms of cooperation and 
convergence, compared to the nature of the previous European Union foreign policy institutional 
setup, as accounted for above, suggests that a new path emerged to create this change. Thus we 
must identify what can be said to account for this change of paths prior to the drafting of the 
Constitutional Treaty.  
 
Enlargement 
We consequently argue that what can account for a critical juncture, causing the change in paths, 
came with the decision to push for enlargement of the European Union. The decision to allow 
accession of the Eastern European states was made at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, 
thus effectively marking the beginning of the enlargement process (EC 1993-6:pt.7). Following this 
decision the existing member states were soon discussing how to prepare the Union for the 
enlargement to the East and the South, commencing preparations for an intergovernmental 
conference on the issue (EC 1994-6).  As   a   result   they   concluded   that   “the challenges and risks 
linked in particular to the prospect of a further enlargement”  necessitated  that  the  Union  prioritized  
“to strengthen common foreign and security policy   (…)”   (EC 1995-6). This need to review the 
EU’s  external  capabilities  was  further  highlighted  by   the  Reflection  Group  for   the  revision  of   the  
existing Treaty, who recommended that the forthcoming intergovernmental conference “(…)  must 
find ways and means of   providing   the   Union   with   a   greater   capacity   for   external   action   (…)  
Enlargement will make this task more difficult, but also makes it even more imperative.”  (EC  1995-
12:Annex 15). That the enlargement has been an underlying factor in this period of incremental 
change is additionally evident with the creation of the Treaty of Nice, which, in the words of the 
Union  “itself”  “(…)  opened  the  way  to  the  institutional  reform  needed  for  the  EU  enlargement  with  
the accession of countries from eastern and southern   Europe.”   (European Union 2014g). Our 
argument   is   further   supported   by   the   European   Council’s   understanding   that   the   enlargement  
necessitates  reform,  potentially  leading  to  an  extension  of  the  Union’s  external  role: 
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“Without reform the Union will not fully   reap   the   benefits   of   enlargement.   (…)   The   current  
enlargement provides the basis for a Union with strong prospects for sustainable growth and an 
important role to play in consolidating stability, peace and democracy in Europe and beyond. ”  
(EC 2002-12:pt.9) 
 
Additionally, Juncos and Borragán state that a process of reform to the EU institutions, to 
accommodate enlargement, was commenced with the Treaty of Amsterdam and was still a crucial 
influence on the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Lisbon (Juncos & Borragán 2013:229).   
 The correlation between enlargement and the wish for the European Union to become 
stronger in the area of foreign policy, which we argue relates to the institutional changes pursued 
with the Constitutional Treaty, is strongly articulated with the Athens Declaration in 2003. The 
Athens Declaration was made in relation to the accession of the new member states and spells out 
the future of Europe in light of the expansion.  
 
“We believe the Union has an essential role to play in the  world  (…)  We  are  committed  to  facing  up  
to our global responsibilities. We will support conflict prevention, promote justice, help secure 
peace  and  defend  global  stability.  (…)  To  these  ends,  the  Union  will  continue  to  enhance  its  civilian  
and military capabilities to enhance stability beyond its borders and further its humanitarian 
goals.“ 
(EC 2003-4:2) 
 
Feedback mechanisms 
To further account for the change of path from a Historical Institutionalism perspective, an 
underlying concept of explanation, which is understood as fundamentally important, is that of 
feedback mechanisms. We argue that the path that the European Union foreign policy institution 
was on, prior to the creation of the Constitutional Treaty, was not defined by positive feedbacks, 
and thus the cost of choosing a new path was not high enough to keep the institutional development 
moving in its original direction. The various statements accounted for above already support this by 
highlighting   the   actors’   perceptions   of   a   need   for   further   change to the institution, because the 
institution is not adequately equipped to meet the demands of the enlargement. This is underlined 
by   the   following   statement,   which   underscores   the   actors’   understanding   of   the   value   of   the  
institution following the Maastricht Treaty.  
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“The   current   possibilities   offered   by   the   [Maastricht, ed.] Treaty have provided some positive 
results. We believe, however, that the time has come to provide this common policy with the means 
to  function  more  effectively.”  
(EC 1995-12)  
 
A concrete example of outright negative feedback in relation to the capabilities of the European 
Union foreign policy institution came with the weak response to the war in Yugoslavia 
(Phinnemore 2013:32).  
We thus argue that the central actors to the European Union foreign policy institution were 
inclined to pursue changes to the institution because the positive feedback mechanisms were either 
limited or even substituted by negative feedback, thereby limiting the costs of changing paths in 
pursuit of a more effective foreign policy institution. 
 
Timing and sequence 
In connection to the feedback mechanisms and their explanation of the importance of specific 
junctures we will turn to the concept of timing and sequence. By departing in the crises in the 
Balkans during the 1990s, it is possible to explain the importance of this concept, which is central to 
Historical Institutionalism analyses. In this relation we argue that the significance of the juncture, 
created by the enlargement, was substantially enhanced by the crises in both Yugoslavia and 
Kosovo. An example of the importance that the crisis in Kosovo had in relation to changing the 
European Union foreign policy institution was highlighted in 1999, in a presidency report on the 
non-military crisis management of the European Union. Here the German presidency concludes that 
in relation to working towards enhancement and better coordination of the military crisis response 
tools   of   the   Union   “Developments inter alia in Kosovo have for their part underlined the 
importance of this task.”  (EC  1999-12:Annex IV). Desmond Dinan supports the importance that the 
Yugoslavian  crisis  had  in  relation  to  the  EU’s  foreign  policy  capabilities.   
 
“Developments in Yugoslavia had exposed deep foreign policy differences among member states 
and  shown  the  limits  of  EU  international  action  (…).  The  Yugoslav  crisis  was  a  salutary  lesson  in  
the limits of European integration, specifically in the difficulty of sharing sovereignty in the 
sensitive areas of security and defense.”   
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(Dinan in Taylor 2006:8) 
 
Thus  we  argue   that   the   timing  of   the  Yugoslavia   and  Kosovo   conflicts,  which  exposed   the  EU’s  
lack of capabilities in terms of providing a coordinated response to external issues, appeared as 
central issues throughout the process of preparing for enlargement. Their significance in exposing 
the lack of capabilities of EU in the area of foreign policy, influencing the feedback mechanisms 
negatively, correlating with the enlargement, is likely to have increased the push towards 
institutional change. As a consequence we argue that this timing of these events was central to the 
EU’s  decision  on  bringing  changes  to  the  European  Union  foreign  policy  institution.       
 
Conjunctures 
We support our argument of an incremental process of change and the fact that timing matters, by 
reference to the concept conjuncture. Here we argue that many of the events, which we have 
already touched upon, have added to the process leading to a critical juncture in turn spurring 
changes to the European Union foreign policy institution. We understand that many serious events, 
relating to external relations and foreign policy, were of great importance in connection to 
underscoring  the  EU’s  lack  of  capacity  in   this  area,  adding  to  the  negative  feedback  mechanisms.  
One such example has already been unfolded by touching upon the crises in the Balkans during the 
90’s.   
A further example of an event, which we argue has contributed to the process towards 
creating change to the European Union foreign policy institution, is that of the terror attacks on the 
11th of September 2009. This is evident in that the European Council, following this event, becomes 
significantly vocal about the need for institutional change to accommodate the fight against 
terrorism, as seen with the following quote: 
 
“The common foreign and security policy will have to integrate further the fight against terrorism.”   
(EC 2001-9:pt. 7) 
 
This is further supported when the European Council states that the European Union must play a 
more significant role in combating terrorism through the CFSP and ESDP, suggesting that the role 
of the Union in this regard, should be reinforced: 
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“The European Council, being determined to reinforce the role of the European Union in 
combating terrorism and recognising the importance of the contribution of the CFSP including the 
ESDP (…)” 
(EC 2002-6:pt. 11) 
 
That the CFSP should be developed in relation to combating terrorism is further elaborated: 
 
“To this end, the extraordinary European Council meeting on 21 September 2001 decided to step 
up the action of the Union against terrorism through a coordinated and inter-disciplinary approach 
embracing all Union policies, including development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) (…).” 
(EC 2002-6:Annex V, pt. 1) 
 
Additionally, it stressed that the member states should pursue closer cooperation following the afore 
mentioned terror attacks (EC 2002-6:Annex V, pt. 3) 
 Furthermore we argue that the war in Iraq, in 2003, also contributed to the European 
Council’s   move   towards   a   change to the European Union foreign policy institution. While 
emphasizing the role of the UN in relation to global matters, the European Council states, in 
connection  to  Iraq,  that  it  is  “(…)  determined to strengthen the capacity of the European Union in 
the context of the CFSP and the ESDP”  (EC  2003-3:pt. 69). Furthermore it is stressed that coherent 
and effective multilateral policy, in order to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, will be worked towards (EC 2003-3:pt. 69). We understand this to be an example of 
how   the  situation   in   Iraq  has  contributed   to   the  European  Council’s  wish   to  make  changes   to   the  
European Union foreign policy institution.  
 In our understanding these conjunctures have all contributed to the process that added 
together made the critical juncture critical, leading to the breakaway from the previously followed 
path and initially spurred the institutional changes to the European Union foreign policy institution. 
This supports and in turn is supported by our understanding that the changes to the European Union 
foreign policy institution, following the decision to expand the European membership, were the 
outcome of an incremental process.  
 
Institutional lock-in and political stability 
Page 46 of 69  
An additional and also important understanding of institutional change, from the Historical 
Institutionalism perspective, relates to the understanding of why actors within institutions will push 
for change. Here Historical Institutionalism emphasizes institutional design to function as a lock-in 
mechanism, serving to limit political insecurity and underpinning the path that is followed. That the 
move towards institutional change was underpinned by the wish to support the political direction of 
the  EU  and  to  limit  actors’  room  for  maneuver  is evident in relation to the process of enlargement. 
Consequently we argue that the member states of the Union had a distinct interest in ensuring 
institutional reform to the area of foreign policy to ensure political stability and direction. The 
Reflection Group underlines this, by stating that enlargement necessitates reform to the European 
Union foreign policy institution: 
 
“Enlargement will make this task more difficult, but also makes it even more imperative.”   
(EC 1995-12:Annex 15). 
 
This is further supported by the European Council, stating that future enlargement is a reason to 
bring changes the EU institutions:  
 
“Moreover, future enlargement, which represents a historic mission and a great opportunity for 
Europe, is also a challenge for the Union in all its dimensions. In this perspective, institutions, as 
well as their functioning, and procedures have to be improved in order to preserve its capacity for 
action  (…)  It  is  essential  to  sustain  the  very  nature  of  European  construction,  which  has  to  preserve 
and develop its features of democracy, efficiency, solidarity, cohesion, transparency and 
subsidiarity  (…)” 
(EC 1996-3) 
 
Additionally, we argue that the EU was interested in locking-in the states in close vicinity through 
institutions. Here we can draw a parallel to the fall of the Berlin wall and the subsequent unrest in 
the Balkans, which created a period of great uncertainty in the European region. In the following 
quote the European Council links the accession of new states with regional stability and peace:  
 
“Externally, the Union is determined to work towards stability and peace on the continent of 
Europe, by preparing for the accession of the associated European countries.”   
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(EC 1995-6) 
 
Furthermore the CFSP, in relation to the Copenhagen Criteria for the new member states, is 
specifically mentioned as a tool to overcome the insecurity: 
 
“The structured relationship covering Common Foreign and Security Policy is especially important 
as a means for overcoming the widespread sense of insecurity in Central and Eastern Europe.” 
(EC 1994-12) 
 
5.1.1 Preliminary conclusion 
By utilizing Historical Institutionalisms explanation of institutional change we accounted for the 
change to the European Union foreign policy institution. Following this analysis we can conclude 
that the changes to the European Union foreign policy institution can be understood to be a result of 
the anticipated enlargement during the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty. These changes were 
largely to be made in relation to the European Unions ability to conduct a common and coordinated 
foreign and policy and were both going to change the organisational capabilities and the scope of 
the European Union foreign policy institution, making foreign policy more comprehensive.  
Additionally, we have established that the change to the European Union foreign policy 
institution was incremental – spanning over many years. The change signified a breakaway from 
previous path dependency, which was centred on an intergovernmental approach to foreign policy, 
with the European Union playing a very limited part. A breakaway from the previous path was, 
however, evident with the changes envisaged with the Constitutional Treaty. This would have 
moved the Union in the direction of more coherence, coordination and in general placing the Union 
centrally   in   relation   to   the   member   states’   external   relations,   making   this   an   area   with   more  
supranational inclinations than ever before. We argue that this breakaway from previous path 
dependency can largely be contributed to the decision of enlargement of the European Union 
towards the south and the east. This decision of moving towards a Union with a significant increase 
in entities accounts for a critical juncture, spurring the incremental change of paths. However, we 
also argue that the enlargement was not the only historical event, which caused the change of paths 
and subsequently the changes to the European Union foreign policy institution. Instead we argue 
that the critical juncture occurred at the end of a long process of conjunctures, causing the feedback 
mechanism, associated with the previous path of European foreign policy, to become increasingly 
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negative consequently decreasing the costs of changing paths. We argue that the most significant of 
these events which caused conjunctures were the crises in the Balkans in the 1990s, the terror 
attacks in the United States in 2001 and the War in Iraq in 2003. We argue that these events have 
been additionally significant because of their eventual timing and sequence. By this we understand 
that their occurrence, together with the decision to reform the Union in time for the enlargement, 
has meant that they came to play a significant part in deciding to change the direction of the 
European Union foreign policy institution. An additional factor in understanding the existing 
member   states’   wish   to   change   the   foreign   policy   institution   can   be   found   in   the   Historical  
Institutionalist understanding of institutional design as a way of controlling actors. Consequently we 
argue that the  changes  to  the  institutional  design  of  the  European  Union’s  foreign  policy  institution,  
as envisaged with the Constitutional Treaty, were instrumental to create political stability both 
regionally  and  within  the  realm  of  the  European  Union’s  political system.  
 
5.2 Understanding Changes to the European Union’s Foreign Policy Institution  
In the following section we will conduct a Discursive Institutional analysis of the discourses 
surrounding the process leading to the identified changes to the European Union foreign policy 
institution.   In  doing  so  we  will   apply  Vivien  Schmidt’s  discursive   institutionalism.  Our  aim   is   to  
identify and account for any possible discursive correlations between the critical juncture and 
conjunctures and the changes to the European Union foreign policy institution. By applying 
concepts from Discursive Institutionalism we will account for the ideas that, through discourse, 
connect the decision to enlarge the European Union with the institutional change pointed out. This 
can help us to explain how this historical event has lead to institutional change.  
 
By scrutinizing documents from the European Council meetings held from 1994 to 2004 we have 
been able to identify the ideas that have been decisive to justify institutional change to the European 
Union foreign policy institution. The ideas that will be the basis of this analysis and explanation 
have all been conveyed through discourse as both cognitive and normative ideas, establishing 
different grounds for institutional changes, but all related to the imminent enlargement of the 
Union. The ideas have been part of an interactive process, where the actors have used their 
capabilities of deliberating about the European Union and the European Union foreign policy 
institution, envisaging change. Not all the ideas are directly related to or talk of changes to the 
European Union foreign policy institution, but they all argue that institutional change is necessary 
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and can thus be said to have underpinned the vision of institutional change. Furthermore, the 
underlying paradigm, which establishes the necessity of enlargement of the Union, in that way 
underpinning all arguments for institutional changes by lifting enlargement to the position of an 
ultimate goal of the European Union, will be discussed in the end of this chapter.   
 
Challenges and necessity 
The first types of ideas, which we will touch upon in this analysis, are those cognitive ideas, which 
articulate institutional change as a necessity in relation to the challenges that follow enlargement.  
 
“The preparatory process is soon to be launched for a new intergovernmental conference with a 
view to making the European Union better able to confront the challenges of the 21st century, 
including those arising from enlargement of the Union to the East and to the South.” 
(EC 1994-6) 
 
We argue that this expression of the discourse shows how the European Council articulate the 
enlargement process as a challenge to the European Union while simultaneously emphasizing that it 
must be capable of addressing such challenges. Consequently, we understand this to be an example 
of a cognitively influenced idea, which indirectly underpins the need for changes to the Union by 
reference to the need to accommodate the enlargement. This is not to say that this argument alone 
have caused the changes to the European Union foreign policy institution, but rather to exemplify 
how the European Council formulates the consequences of the imminent accession as an event that 
the EU need to prepare itself for. In this way we argue that this idea can be said to represent the 
fundamental understanding of the enlargement as a challenge. The idea of the enlargement as 
necessitating changes to the functioning of the European Union is further underpinned by the 
following discursive articulation of the enlargement as necessitating improvements and changes: 
 
 “In that spirit, we have tried to identify the improvements needed to (…) prepare it [the Union ed.] 
for the next enlargement. We consider that the Conference should focus on necessary changes, 
without embarking on a complete revision of the Treaty.” 
(EC 1995–12:Annex 15) 
 
Changes  to  the  European  Union’s  institutions 
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In its deliberations on the consequences of the accession of the new member states the European 
Council on many occasions call for changes to the European institutions. It does so in light of the 
cognitive ideas justifying changes as a necessity to the enlargement. In the following example the 
European Council conveys the idea that the enlargement, being a challenge to the European Union, 
must  be  improved  if  the  Union  is  to  retain  its  “capacity for action”. 
 
“Moreover, future enlargement (…)  is also a challenge for the Union in all its dimensions. In this 
perspective, institutions, as well as their functioning, and procedures have to be improved in order 
to preserve its capacity for action (…)” 
(EC 1996-3) 
 
This   is   followed   by   an   articulation   of   how   changes   to   the   Union’s   treaties   can   ensure   that   its  
institutions function properly following the enlargement. Presented through this articulation, is the 
idea that institutional change is imperative if the Union institutions are to function and thus the 
justification of institutional change lies within the prospect of enlargement. We thus argue that this 
discursively conveyed idea shows the importance of institutional change, which the European 
Council sees in relation to enlargement of the member base of the Union: 
 
“The Presidency's report demonstrates the significant headway which has been achieved by the 
Conference in considering Treaty changes which will ensure that the Union continues to have 
properly functioning, efficient and legitimate institutions after enlargement.” 
(EC 2000-6:A,3)  
 
The following statement further supports that the European Council understands enlargement as 
necessitating reform to the European Union: 
 
“Without reform the Union will not fully reap the benefits of enlargement” 
(EC 2002-12:pt.8) 
 
Changes to the European Union foreign policy institution 
The preceding paragraphs have established that the ideas contained within the discourse related to 
enlargement, as seen in the European Council, conveys ideas of the enlargement as a challenge to 
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the European Union, which necessitates institutional changes.  
Succeeding this will be an elaboration of how the enlargement furthermore is linked to ideas 
of specific changes to the European Union foreign policy institution. In line with what we have 
shown before, the following quote articulates enlargement as a challenge that the European Union 
should respond to. A difference from the preceding quotes, however, lies in the kind of ideational 
argumentation, which is represented herein. In contrast to the first articulations, this idea is largely 
normative in that it argues that the Union should act in relation   to   its   citizens’   expectations.  
Furthermore the European Council articulates a clear policy area, which needs strengthening in 
order   to   accommodate   the   Union   citizens’   expectations   in   relation   to   the   rising   challenges   of  
enlargement. This policy area is the CFSP, which is encapsulated by the European Union foreign 
policy institution. 
 
“Furthermore, in view of the (…) challenges and risks linked in particular to the prospect of a 
further enlargement, the European Council considers that thoughts should now focus on a number 
of priorities to enable the Union to respond to its citizens' expectations: 
(…)   
– to strengthen common foreign and security policy so that it can cope with new international 
challenges;;” 
(EC 1995-6) 
 
The European Council further uses the enlargement as a reason to deliberate about changes to the 
European Union foreign policy institution. In the following quote we can identify that the European 
Council is very vocal about how enlargement creates the need for the Union to obtain greater 
capacity in the area of external relations. Again the idea is cognitive in pointing to the enlargement 
as the factor, which creates a need for the changes to the institution. 
 
 “We think that the Conference must find ways and means of providing the Union with a greater 
capacity for external action (…)  Enlargement will make this task more difficult, but also makes it 
even more imperative.” 
(EC 1995–12:Annex 15) 
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In line with what we have accounted for above, the European Council further deliberates on the 
consequences of enlargement. In the following quote, the idea of institutional change is also 
articulated as a need in relation to the enlargement. Here, however, the European Council is specific 
in stating that the enlargement necessitates that the Union, in relation to its institutions, pursues 
improvements so as to make it more dynamic in its decision-making. 
 
“Institutional issues will be central to the next phase of the negotiations. The Union needs to 
improve its ability to take decisions and to act. This is already true today and it will be even more 
necessary as the Union moves to enlarge its membership further.” 
(EC 1996-12:pt.6) 
 
Once again we categorize this idea as a cognitive idea because it constructs the need to pursue 
institutional improvements by reference to the necessity created with the imminent enlargement. 
Basically   the   enlargement   is   articulated   as   furthering   the   European   Union’s   need   for   improved  
decision-making. Additionally this idea articulates an underlying wish for a more coherent 
European Union in the face of enlargement. This we argue in relation to the deliberation of the need 
for the Union as increasingly capable of making decisions. We furthermore point out that this is 
likely connected to the wish for greater external capabilities of the Union. As we have already 
shown in the previous analysis, the Union has been extensively limited in its external action 
because of a rigid decision-making structure in the area of foreign policy, which was somewhat 
revised with the treaties of Amsterdam and Nice, but proposed additionally changed with the 
Constitutional Treaty. This claim is supported by the following quote where the European Council 
calls for enhanced decision-making capabilities in relation to improving its external action 
capabilities, again underpinning this argument with the prospect of imminent enlargement. This 
idea cognitively argues that the impending enlargement necessitates that the European Union 
furthers its external capabilities and that to do so it must improve its decision-making capabilities, 
which will lead to greater and more coherent external capabilities: 
 
“The European Council also reaffirmed the aim which it set in Florence of developing the external 
action of the Union. The Union must enhance its capacity to ensure that its external action is 
coherent and effective in all its aspects, and it must improve its decision-making procedures, if it is 
to play a role in the world commensurate with its responsibilities and its potential. The European 
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Council emphasizes strongly that the future of the Union and the success of the further enlargement 
to which it has committed itself will depend on a satisfactory resolution of all of these questions.” 
(EC 1996-12:IV) 
 
This connection between enlargement and the need for greater external capabilities is further 
elaborated in the following quote, which is a comment on an intergovernmental conference, which 
was tasked with preparing for enlargement (European Union 2014h). 
 
“(…)   the European Council asks that a general outline for a draft revision of the Treaties, be 
prepared (…)  addressing in particular the following aims: 
 
(…) bringing the Union closer to its citizens in particular by: 
 
- strengthening and enlarging the scope of the Union's common foreign and security policy, 
which means in particular addressing, with the purpose of a greater consistency and 
efficiency: 
 
= better coherence between a reformed CFSP and a strengthened external economic action; 
 
- and, finally, assuring, also in view of enlargement, the good functioning of Institutions while 
respecting their balance, and the efficiency of the decision-making process, (…)” 
(EC 1996-6:V,4) 
 
We argue that the discursively articulated ideas here show how the enlargement acts as the 
foundational argument for institutional reform of the European Union foreign policy institution. 
Firstly, the European Council underpins the drafting of a treaty revision, by normatively pointing to 
the aim of bringing the Union closer to its citizens. The discourse then articulates that in order to 
bring the Union closer to its citizens, it is necessary to reform the CFSP by widening its scope 
through securing greater consistency, more coherence between the CFSP and the economic action 
of the Union and additionally securing that the Union institutions function. All of this is to be 
understood in relation to the pending enlargement. We consequently argue that this example of the 
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discourse contains both normative and cognitive ideas, which constructs a connection between the 
enlargement and the necessity of institutional changes.  
 
Conjunctures  
As accounted for in the analysis conducted through Historical Institutionalism, section 5.1 
Explaining   Reasons   to   Changes   to   the   European   Union’s   Foreign   Policy   Institution, we can 
account for several significant historical events, which can be suggested to have had additional 
effects on the decision to pursue changes to the European Union foreign policy institution. We 
accounted for these events through the concept conjunctures and pointed towards the war in the 
Balkans, the terror attacks in New York 11th September 2001 and the war in Iraq as events that 
could have had influence. In the following section we will trace the impact of the terror attacks on 
11th September 2001 and those in Madrid 11th March 2004 through the discourse derived from the 
European Council meetings. 
With the happening of the terror attacks on the 11th of September, the ideas of combating 
terrorism entered the discourse of the European Council in relation to external action and on this 
account it is articulated as a priority of the Union to combat terrorism: 
 
“Terrorism is a real challenge to the world and to Europe. The European Council has decided that 
the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the European Union.“ 
(EC 2001-9:1) 
 
From the beginning the discourse expresses the need for the Union to pursue more consistency and 
coordination between its policies, if it is to effectively fight the threat of terrorism. Consequently, 
the specific idea that the CFSP needs to encompass the fight against terrorism is brought forward:   
 
“Thus, the General Affairs Council will ensure greater consistency and coordination between all 
the Union's policies. The Common Foreign and Security Policy will have to integrate further the 
fight against terrorism.” 
(EC 2001-9:3, pt.7) 
 
The discourse further evolves, presenting the fight against terror as an integral part of the European 
Union’s  external  relations  policy. 
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“The European Council has noted the significant achievements accomplished in the implementation 
of the Plan of Action to combat terrorism and reiterates that the fight against terrorism will 
continue to be a priority objective of the European Union and a key plank of its external relations 
policy.” 
(EC 2002-6:Annex V:pt.2) 
 
The   fight   against   terror   furthermore   acts   as   the   idea   underpinning   the   Union’s   push   for  
enhancement of its military capabilities because it should act as a stabilising factor outside of its 
own borders as emphasised through the analysis above.  
 
“We are determined to work at all levels to tackle global terrorism and stem the weapons of mass 
destruction. To these ends, the Union will continue to enhance its civilian and military capabilities 
to enhance stability beyond its borders (…)” 
(EC 2003-4c:2) 
 
Following this short outline of a much more complex discourse it is evident how the occurrence of 
terrorism as a part of the discourse of the European Council evolves. From being about distancing 
the Unions from the concept of terror and stating it as a key priority to fight terrorism, the discourse 
goes on to deliberating about adaptations of the Union in relation to combating terrorism. At first 
these initiatives are vague in nature, mostly amounting to broad concepts of a better functioning 
fight against terrorism. But in the end the ideas put forward through the discourse are more specific 
and suggestions of how the Union, by revising and adding to its policies, can more effectively 
combat terrorism, are put forward.  
Thus we argue that the discourse, which conveys ideas of institutional changes in relation to 
fighting terrorism, is likely to have underpinned the discourse conveying ideas of institutional 
change in the light of enlargement. As the discourse consists of correlating ideas, but in relation to 
different problems, we argue that together they made for a stronger case for institutional change. 
 
5.2.1 Preliminary conclusion 
In the light of the correlations accounted for above we argue the following: The discourse present 
within the European Council, following  the  decision  to  enlarge  the  European  Union’s  member  base,  
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creates a link between the accession of new states and the need to bring institutional reform to the 
European Union foreign policy institution. Additionally, we argue that these ideational linkages 
between enlargement and institutional change can be explained through constructing three 
interlinked elements of the discourse. The first part articulates the ideas of the discourse in order to 
frame the enlargement as a challenge to the European Union. The second part creates a link 
between this challenge, which the enlargement is, and the need for institutional change. The third is 
a more specific link between enlargement and the need to bring changes to the European Union 
foreign policy institution, mostly articulated in relation to the CFSP. Furthermore we argue that the 
discourse, which conveys ideas of institutional changes in relation to the fight against terrorism, is 
have likely underpinned the discourse conveying ideas of institutional change.  
 
The success of the discourse 
As we have accounted for in the previous analysis, section 5.1 Explaining Reason to Changes to the 
European   Union’s   Foreign   Policy   Institution, the European Council did commit to change the 
European Union foreign policy institution with the Constitutional Treaty. In relation hereto we have 
shown, through both Historical and Discursive Institutionalism, that the decision to expand the 
European Union through the accession of new states was what caused the European Council to 
pursue institutional change to the European Union foreign policy institution. To further underpin 
our argument we will now commence with further analysis of the discourse that we argue has acted 
as the causal mechanism, which translated the 2004 enlargement into institutional change in the 
European Union foreign policy institution. This part of the analysis will concentrate on explaining 
what made this discourse significant and successful in order to further understand how it can be 
argued to have lead to institutional changes.  
 
The underpinning programme or paradigm 
As accounted for in our operationalisation of Discursive Institutionalism, section 3.2 
Operationalization of Discursive Institutionalism, there are three levels of ideas in discourse. What 
we have analysed above are the ideas, which Vivien Schmidt describes as policy-ideas. By 
accounting for the programmatic idea inherent in the discourse we can explain the success of the 
discourse and thus underpin the argument that it acted as the causal mechanism between the 
decision to expand the European Union and the push for institutional changes to the European 
Union foreign policy institution.  
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Throughout the European Council meetings held from 1994 to 2004 we have identified a 
programmatic idea or paradigm, which we argue is constructed around the idea that the European 
Union is meant to act as regional stabiliser on the European Continent. The following quotation is 
an example of the articulation of the idea that European Union will act as a regional stabiliser in 
pursuit of peace and stability on the continent:  
 
”Externally, the Union is determined to work towards stability and peace on the continent of 
Europe (…)” 
(EC 1995-6) 
 
Furthermore the European Council articulates how an enlargement of the European   Union’s  
member base will ensure the goal of a stable Europe. In this way the paradigm helps to justify the 
enlargement through constructing a cognitive idea of the necessity of enlargement. This is further 
supported by the argument that enlargement will unify Europe, which conveys the idea that 
enlargement brings stability to the continent by unifying the European states.  
 
“That next enlargement provides a great opportunity for the political reunification of Europe. Not 
only is it a political imperative for us, but it represents the best option for the stability of the 
continent (…)” 
(EC 1995-12:Annex 15) 
 
This  paradigmatic  idea  is  a  decisive  factor  in  the  European  Union’s  pursuit  of  enlargement.  This  is  
so because the paradigm acts as the underlying   idea   framing   enlargement   of   the   Union’s  
membership, as a stabilising factor and thereby a solution to the problem of instability. In 
connection   hereto   is   an   articulated   correlation   between   the   Union’s   capacities   in   relation   to   the  
European Union foreign policy institution and the aim of pursuing a more external role of the 
Union. 
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“The Union must enhance its capacity to ensure that its external action is coherent and effective in 
all its aspects, and it must improve its decision-making procedures, if it is to play a role in the 
world commensurate with its responsibilities and its potential.”7 
(EC 1996-12) 
 
Here the discourse articulates the idea that the Union must strengthen its capacity in order to ensure 
that it can be coherent and effective in its external actions, which further points to the vision of a 
Union with a more externally focused role. We argue that this discursively articulated paradigmatic 
idea of the European Union as increasingly active in relation to external relations serves the twofold 
purpose of legitimising the policy-ideas related to the enlargement and the idea of pursuing 
institutional changes. By reference to the idea of an externally active European Union as a necessity 
to European peace and stability this paradigm underpins the ideas of a need for institutional change 
and enlargement.  
 
Ideas, discourse and polity  
In the previously unfolded analysis of the discourse present in the European Council, we have 
touched upon the use of cognitively and normatively anchored ideas. It seems obvious that the 
European  Council’s  discourse,  which  links  the  enlargement  with  the  pursuit  of  institutional  changes  
to the European Union foreign policy institution, mostly conveys ideas of cognitive decent. 
Normally such a one-sided application of cognitive ideas would not make for a viable discourse 
with the power to justify action. However, in order to explain how the discourse has effectively 
served as a persuasive convening of ideas, causing the changes to the European Union foreign 
policy institution we turn to the concept of polities and types of discourses.  
As accounted for in the operationalization of Discursive Institutionalism there is a difference 
between compound and simple polities and conversely there is a difference between which types of 
discourse will be prevalent within the two. In relation hereto we argue that the European Union is in 
general, and the European Council specifically, a form of compound polity. We anchor this 
argument in the fact that the EU consists of many governing institutions that work together on 
formulating and passing the policies of the Union. Furthermore, the European Council is composed 
by all the heads of state of the member states that must work together on setting the agenda of the                                                         7 We are aware that the quote has been part of a previous quote but we justify using it again as it here underpins a 
different point  
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Union. This in itself makes for a very compound policy arena. This explains the prevalence of 
cognitive ideas and the limited appearance of those that are anchored in normative conceptions.  
 
Interactive process and discursive abilities  
Another important concept to unfold in order to fully understand how discourse could have acted as 
the causal mechanism between the enlargement and the pursuit of institutional change to the 
European Union foreign policy institution is that of the interactive process. As already accounted 
for in section 3.2 Operationalization of Discursive Institutionalism the interactive process is what 
enables actors to convey ideas through discourse and thus conduct agency. Fundamental to this is 
the   actors’   abilities   to,   through  discourse,   present   alternatives   to the institutional setups of which 
they are part. In our analysis we have duly accounted for that this ability is truly present within the 
European Council. Throughout the analysis we have shown how the discourse present within the 
European Council, has presented alternatives to the European Union foreign policy institution, 
envisaging it as increasingly capacitated, more coherent and thus presenting the Union with a tool 
to pursue a more external role. Additionally, we have shown how the discourse conveys the idea of 
institutional reform in order to make the Union ready for the imminent enlargement, also in relation 
to the European Union foreign policy institution. Thus, there are significant indications of the 
interactive process of presenting alternatives to the existing institutional setups, and in that way 
constructing a discourse, which can act as the causal mechanisms instigating institutional change.  
This also helps us to account for the discursive abilities of the agents within the European 
Council, who have utilized their background ideational abilities and their foreground discursive 
abilities to construct discourses relating to the institutions that convey alternative ideas of what the 
institutions could be like. This is most evident when the European Council receives and discusses 
the reports that they receive from the Council of Ministers or the Reflection Groups. However, we 
are aware of the limitations to our analysis. These consist in the fact that our data has not allowed us 
to properly account for agency, as it does not show any interaction between actors, but merely 
provides us with overall conclusions.  
 
5.2.2 Preliminary conclusion  
In the preceding section we have explained what made the discourse, which conveyed the idea of 
change to the European Union foreign policy institution, successful. This we have done by 
accounting for the programmatic idea inherent in the discourse. This programmatic idea or 
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paradigm, we argue, is based on the idea that the European Union is meant to act as a regional 
stabiliser on the European Continent. Furthermore we have shown that this discourse mostly 
consists of cognitive ideas, which makes sense in relation to the European Union being a compound 
polity. This explains how the discourse can be successful in spite of the dominant prevalence of 
cognitive ideas and the limited appearance of those that are anchored in normative conceptions. 
Additionally we have shown that the discourse present within the European Council, has presented 
alternatives to the European Union foreign policy institution through the interactive process, in that 
way constructing a discourse, which can act as the causal mechanisms instigating institutional 
change. Although we have trouble accounting for the discursive abilities of the agents within the 
European Council, because of the limitations to our data, we argue that agents have constructed 
discourses. These discourses convey alternative ideas of what the institutions could be like, in that 
way showing that their background ideational and foreground discursive abilities must have been 
applied.   
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Chapter  6  Conclusion 
 
Through our analysis we have accounted for the impact of the enlargement, of the European Union, 
on the decision to work towards the institutional changes envisaged with the failed Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe.  
We firstly establish the relationship between the enlargement and institutional change through 
a Historical Institutional analysis. Subsequently we have demonstrated that the decision to expand 
the European  Union’s  membership  in  2004  was  decisive  to  the  Union’s  wish  to  pursue  changes  to 
the European Union foreign policy institution. We began by establishing that the Constitutional 
Treaty contained significant reforms to the European foreign policy institution. Thereupon we were 
able to establish that the decision to pursue enlargement constituted a critical juncture, resulting in a 
break with the previous path dependent intergovernmentalism inherent in the European Union 
foreign policy institution. This was underpinned by pointing to the lack of positive feedback 
associated with the European Union foreign policy institution at the time. Consequently we were 
able to identify the timing of the decision for enlargement as a significant factor along with parallel 
events of significance.  
 
Secondly we have accounted for the causal relationship between the decision to pursue enlargement 
and the decision to pursue institutional change to the European foreign policy institution. This was 
achieved through application of Discursive Institutionalism as our theoretical frame of explanation. 
Through thorough analysis we have been able to establish that the idea of the European Union 
as a regional stabiliser was an underlying reason for the Union to pursue enlargement. In short, the 
European   Council’s   perception   of   the   European   continent   as   experiencing   a   period   of   regional  
instability necessitated an enlargement to the east and the south. 
Once the decision to pursue enlargement was taken, and the candidate countries applied for 
membership, the European Council prepared for what they envisioned as both a great opportunity 
and a great challenge to the Union. With the accession of ten new states the European Council were 
vocal about the need for institutional changes to the  European  Union’s  institutional  setup.   
We have specifically managed to trace three policy ideas that served to underpin the need for 
institutional change to European Union foreign policy institution. These were the need for a more 
externally visible Union, more coherence and coordination in the area of foreign policy and external 
actions, along with greater capacity in relation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy.  
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 We were able to identify additional important events to the vision of institutional 
change. Although we have not elaborated comprehensively on these we are confident in stating that, 
the terror attacks in New York and Madrid contributed to the decision to pursue institutional 
change. By their significance these events were profoundly represented through the discourse in the 
European Union and were linked to ideas of institutional alterations and change in the following 
years.  
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ANNEX I: Schema On Data From The European Council Meetings 
Reference Type Of Document Type Of 
Meeting 
Date Of Meeting Location Of 
Meeting 
EC 1994-6 Presidency Conclusion Formal 24-25 June 1994 Corfu 
EC 1994-12 Presidency Conclusion Formal 9–10 December 1994 Essen 
EC 1995-6 Presidency Conclusion Formal 26–27 June 1995 Cannes 
EC 1995-12 Presidency Conclusion Formal 15–16 December 1995 Madrid 
EC 1996-3 Presidency Conclusion Formal 29 March 1996 Turin 
EC 1996-6 Presidency Conclusion Formal 21–22 June 1996 Florence 
EC 1996-12 Presidency Conclusion Formal 13–14 December 1996 Dublin 
EC 1997-6 Presidency Conclusion Formal 16-17 June 1997 Amsterdam 
EC 1997-11 Presidency Conclusion Extraordinary  20-21 November 1997 Luxembourg 
EC 1997-12 Presidency Conclusion Formal 12-13 December 1997 Luxembourg 
EC 1998-6 Presidency Conclusion Formal 15-16 June 1998 Cardiff 
EC 1998-12 Presidency Conclusion Formal 11-12 December 1998 Vienna 
EC 1999-3a Presidency Conclusion Formal 24-25 March 1999 Berlin 
EC 1999-3b Statement Formal 24-25 March 1999 Berlin 
EC 1999-3c Statement Formal 24-25 March 1999 Berlin 
EC 1999-6 Presidency Conclusion Formal 3-4 June 1999 Cologne 
EC 1999-10 Presidency Conclusion Formal 15-16 October 1999 Tampere 
EC 1999-12 Presidency Conclusion Formal 10-11 December 1999 Helsinki 
EC 2000-3 Presidency Conclusion Formal 23-24 March 2000 Lisbon 
EC 2000-6 Presidency Conclusion Formal 19-20 June 2000 Santa Maria Da Feira 
EC 2000-11 Declaration Formal 26 November 2000 Biarritz 
EC 2000-12 Presidency Conclusion Formal 7-9 December 2000 Nice 
EC 2001-3 Presidency Conclusion Formal 23-24 March 2001 Stockholm 
EC 2001-6 Presidency Conclusion Formal 15-16 June 2001 Göteborg 
EC 2001-9 Conclusion And Plan Of 
Action 
Extraordinary  21 September 2001 Brussels 
EC 2001-10 Declaration  Informal  19 October 2001 Ghent  
EC 2001-12 Presidency Conclusion  14-15 December 2001 Laeken 
EC 2002-3 Presidency Conclusion Formal 15-16 March 2002 Barcelona 
EC 2002-6 Presidency Conclusion Formal 21-22 June 2002 Seville 
EC 2002-11 Presidency Conclusion Formal 24-25 October 2002 Brussels 
EC 2002-12 Presidency Conclusion Formal 12-13 December 2002 Copenhagen 
EC 2003-2 Conclusion Extraordinary  17 February 2003 Brusseles 
EC 2003-3 Presidency Conclusion Formal 20-21 March 2003 Brussels 
EC 2003-4a Press Release Informal 16 April 2003 Athens 
EC 2003-4b Declaration Informal 16 April 2003 Athens 
EC 2003-4c Declaration Informal 16 April 2003 Athens 
EC 2003-6 Presidency Conclusion Formal 19-20 June 2003 Thessaloniki 
EC 2003-10 Presidency Conclusion Formal 16-17 October 2003 Brussels 
EC 2003-12 Presidency Conclusion Formal 12-13 December 2003 Brussels 
EC 2004-3a Presidency Conclusion Formal 25-26 March 2004 Brussels 
EC 2004-3b Declaration Formal 25 March 2004 Brussels 
EC 2004-6 Presidency Conclusion Formal 17-18 June 2004 Brussels 
EC 2004-11 Presidency Conclusion Formal 4-5 November 2004 Brussels 
 
